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Originalism, the Declaration of
Independence, and the Constitution: A
Unique Role in Constitutional
Interpretation?
Lee J. Strang*
I.

Introduction

The role of the Declaration of Independence in constitutional
interpretation is contested. Some argue that it is "at the heart of the
Constitution,"' that the Declaration "is fundamental to a proper
understanding of the Constitution,"2 and that Americans should interpret
"the Constitution through the lens of the Declaration." 3 I will refer to
scholars such as these, who argue that the Declaration should play a
unique role in constitutional interpretation, as Declarationists.4
Others have argued that "the Declaration as the meaning of the
Constitution is almost incomprehensible" 5 because "the Declaration of
Independence has no standing in constitutional interpretation

* Assistant Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law. I would like to thank my
loving wife Elizabeth for her sacrifice to allow me to write this Article. I would also like
to thank the participants at the Ave Maria Faculty Workshop who offered their input, the
participants at the 2006 University Faculty For Life Conference for their suggestions,
Bryce Poole, Justin Gardner, Tim Kuhn, Travis Comstock, and Stephen Burch for their
research assistance, and especially Howard Bromberg whose enthusiasm for the
Declaration of Independence was the impetus for this Article.
1. SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 3 (1995).
2. Dan Himmelfarb, Note, The ConstitutionalRelevance of the Second Sentence of
the DeclarationofIndependence, 100 YALE L.J. 169, 170 (1990).
3. Timothy Sandefur, Liberal Originalism:A Pastfor the Future, 27 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 489, 505 (2004).
4. Declarationists are those who believe that the Declaration's role in constitutional
interpretation is greater than its role as a source of the Constitution's original meaning.
5. Patrick M. O'Neil, The Declaration as Ur-Constitution: The Bizarre
JurisprudentialPhilosophy of Professor Harry V.Jaffa, 28 AKRON L. REv. 237, 252
(1995).
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whatsoever.",6 As Justice Scalia has stated more critically: "If you want
aspirations, you can read the Declaration of Independence.... There is
no such philosophizing in our Constitution, which, unlike the Declaration7
is a practical and pragmatic charter of government.",
of Independence ...
In this Article, I argue that the Declaration of Independence is one
of many sources of the Constitution's original meaning. First, I discuss
the background debate over the role of the Declaration in constitutional
interpretation and how appeals to the Declaration have periodically
arisen during times of national moral crisis, such as those over slavery
and civil rights. I also detail how scholars have relied on the Declaration
to support dramatically inconsistent claims of political morality and
constitutional norm.
an
originalist
perspective
on constitutional
Assuming
interpretation,8 I then argue that the historical evidence from the Framing
and Ratification of the Constitution shows that the Declaration is simply
one source of the original meaning of the Constitution. 9 In addition, I
show that the Declaration is not the "interpretative key" to the
Constitution because they are inconsistent, and because the Declaration
cannot provide sufficient interpretative guidance. Lastly, I advance
arguments to establish that the Declaration is not legally binding. In
doing so, I rebut many of the common Declarationist claims.' °
Debate Over the Role of the Declaration of Independence in
Constitutional Interpretation

II.

A.

Introduction

Part 1I will review the debate, both past and present, over what role,
if any, the Declaration should have in constitutional interpretation."
6.

Interview by Lewis E. Lehrman with Benno Schmidt, quoted in Lewis E.

Lehrman, On Jaffa, Lincoln, Marshall, and Original Intent, in HARRY V. JAFFA ET AL.,
ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION 3, 5 (1994).
7.
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE

LAW 134 (1997).
8. I assume an originalist perspective because most Declarationists are originalists
or make originalist arguments, because originalism is a major theory of constitutional
interpretation, and because I believe that originalism is correct.
9. Because of space constraints, and because Declarationists infrequently rely on it,
I will only note in passing the historical evidence from the "Reconstruction Constitution,"
that is, the changes to the Constitution brought about during the period of Reconstruction.
10. One of the purposes of this Article is to respond to relatively weak originalist
claims that the Declaration should play a unique role in constitutional interpretation. In
doing so, I hope to prevent the discrediting of stronger originalist arguments and, in the
long run, to strengthen originalism by advancing the strongest legal arguments on its
behalf.
11. For background on the drafting of the Declaration see ALLEN JAYNE,
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First, I describe how appeals to the Declaration have ebbed and waned,
and how, during periods of great moral introspection, such appeals
multiplied. 12 Second, I show how scholars and others have varied
dramatically in their view of the Declaration's role in constitutional
interpretation. Third, I recount how Declarationists themselves have
come to radically divergent conclusions regarding the practical impact of
the Declaration playing a unique role in constitutional interpretation.
Many of today's Declarationists, like some Americans in the past, use
the Declaration to advance their respective views on policy and
constitutional meaning. Therefore, I will discuss how the Declaration
was viewed throughout our nation's history to show that today's
Declarationists are continuing an old tradition.13
B. PeriodicResurgence of Appeals to the Declarationin Times of
Grave Moral Crisis
1.

The "Original" Declaration

The Declaration of Independence is one of the most revered
documents in American history, 14 and as a result, various political
movements have appealed to it in order to garner support for the
movement's proposed reforms-especially when the Constitution is
widely thought to be at odds with or indifferent to the political goals of
the social reformers. This is in contrast to how the document was viewed
in the period following separation from Britain.
Originally, the Declaration was viewed primarily as a "proclamation
of independence." 1 5 It provided the colonies with the moral and political
justifications for separating from Great Britain. Rather than focusing on
the rights phrase' 6 in the Declaration's second paragraph-as today's
JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: ORIGINS, PHILOSOPHY, & THEOLOGY
(1998); PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE (1998); GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION

OF INDEPENDENCE (2002).
12. See Charles H. Cosgrove, The Declaration of Independence in Constitutional
Interpretation: A Selective History and Analysis, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 107 (1998)
(providing an overview of appeals to the Declaration).
13. See infra Part III.B.1.c.
14. One can see this, for instance, in the titles of popular books on the Declaration
such as those by Wills, Inventing America, and Maier, American Scripture.
15. Philip F. Detweiler, The Changing Reputation of the Declaration of
Independence: The First Fifty Years, 19 WM. & MARY Q. 557, 558 (1962); see also
MAIER, supra note 11, at 154-208 (describing the change in public attitudes towards the
Declaration).
16. The rights phrase is a phrase in the second paragraph of the Declaration: "that all
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain un-alienable
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Declarationists do-the contemporaries of the document focused both on
its conclusion, which declared to the world that the thirteen colonies
were independent, 7 and on the specific charges lodged against King
George III in the Declaration's body.' 8 In addition, unlike today's
Declarationists, when early Americans discussed natural rights and
referred to a document to support their claims, the document to which
they most often referred was the Virginia Declaration of Rights, not the
Declaration. 19
At first, in the years following independence, little attention was
paid to the Declaration. 20 Such silence towards the Declaration is
understandable since the task facing the nation was no longer revolution,
but rather the construction of a new legal order. 21 But silence regarding
the Declaration was short-lived. Once the dust settled and a new legal
order was firmly established, social reformers could not resist using the
rights phrase to further their political causes. As one Declarationist
scholar recognized, "a national political movement brought the
Declaration of Independence 'back into American life.' 22 By the 1820s,
"the Declaration's newfound status as a sacred document made it
extremely useful
for causes attempting to seize the moral high ground in
23
public debate.,

The different reform movements discussed below each used the
Declaration in different ways.24 On one end of the spectrum were those
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."
THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
17. Detweiler, supra note 15, at 558.
18. For example, during the ratification process of the Articles of Confederation,
New Jersey explained its reservations concerning Article VI. Article VI provided that
Congress would determine when to station troops in a state for purposes of protecting the
state. THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. VI (1781). New Jersey sought to require
the assent of nine states for the keeping of a "Body of Troops" because the constant
upkeep of troops ran counter to the Declaration:
In the memorable Act of Congress, declaring the United Colonies free and
independent States, it is emphatically mentioned, as one of the Causes of
Separation from Great-Britain, that the Sovereign thereof had kept up
among us in Time of Peace, standing Armies without the Consent of the
Legislatures.
1 MERRILL JENSEN, THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION: CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS, 1776-1787, 114 (1976).

19. Detweiler, supra note 15, at 561-62.
20. MAIER, supra note 11, at 168-69.
2 1. See MAIER, supra note 11, at 212 ("The predicament of preserving a nation that
formally began with a revolutionary manifesto ... fell to the Federalists in the 1790s.
Their solution was to forget the Declaration of Independence.").
22. Robert J. Reinstein, Completing the Constitution: The Declaration of
Independence, Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment, 66 TEMP. L. REv. 361, 378-79
(1993) (citation omitted).
23. MAIER, supra note 11, at 197.
24. The movements below may not be the entire universe of major social movements
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who argued that the Declaration, and especially its rights phrase,
embodied the ideals of the Republic and that the law should be changed
to correspond to those ideals. On the other end were those who claimed
that the Declaration, either of its own accord or through its influence on
the Constitution's meaning, had already effected the legal goal(s) of the
reform movement by, for example, outlawing slavery. Of course, as
reform movements, they represented a minority position trying to change
the status quo.
2.

Abolition Movement

The first social movement to extensively rely on the Declaration of
Independence was the abolition movement. The Constitution by itself
was widely seen as inadequate to accomplish the goals of the
abolitionists because, as explained below, it explicitly accommodated
slavery.25 In order to legitimize the antislavery movement, abolitionists
turned to the Declaration's rights phrase.
Mainstream abolitionists considered the Declaration to be the
ultimate expression of America's founding principles. They viewed it as
the primary document of the nation's founding which the Constitution
was ratified to preserve. Thus, the Constitution, although allowing
slavery, was ratified with a view towards its gradual elimination. Other,
more radical abolitionists took the view that the Declaration had
abolished slavery or at least rendered it unconstitutional for the federal
government to support slavery. The most radical abolitionists used the
Declaration as a moral justification for their actions, which, for some,
included overthrowing the unjust constitutional order that sanctioned
slavery.26
According to abolitionist James G. Birney, if the Constitution
recognized and protected slavery's continued existence and extension to
other territories, "then the Constitution and the Declaration of
Independence were irreconcilable. 2 7 Birney refused to accept this
proposition:
To suppose, said Birney, before the dust and sweat of the Revolution
was well wiped away from those men, that they would falsify the
principles for which they risked their lives, in consenting to fasten

to use the Declaration.
25. See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing the tensions between the Declaration and the
Constitution).
26. See Cosgrove, supra note 12, at 117-18 (giving these three divisions of the
abolitionist movement).
27. DWIGHT LOWELL DUMOND, ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL WAR IN THE
UNITED STATES 73 (1959).
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slavery forever on the weakest of their fellow creatures on manwoman-child-and even the infant yet unborn-is what I will not
do, except on testimony that 28
cannot be overthrown-testimony that I
have never yet seen or heard.
For Birney, the principles of the Declaration were a fundamental part of
the nation's laws, thus, the Constitution was drafted with the expectation
29
that slavery would be "speedily abolished.
Birney's conception of how the Constitution and the Declaration
interacted represented the mainstream view among abolitionists prior to
the Civil War. Abraham Lincoln 30 emphasized the importance of the
Union and the Constitution when he summarized this view:
Without the Constitution and the Union, we would not have attained
the result; but even these, are not the primary cause of our great
prosperity. There is something back of these, entwining itself more
closely about the human heart. That something, is the principle of
"Liberty to all"-the principle that clears the path for all-gives hope
to all-and, by consequence, enterprise, and industry to all.
The expression of that principle, in our Declaration of Independence,
was most happy, and fortunate. Without this, as well as with it, we
could have declared our independence of Great Britain; but without
it, we could not, I think, have secured our free government, and
consequent prosperity. No oppressed people will fight, and endure,
as our fathers did, without the promise of something better, than a
mere change of masters.
The assertion of that principle, at that time, was the word, "fitly
spoken" which has proved an "apple of gold" to us. The Union and
the Constitution, are the picture of silver, subsequently framed
around it. The picture was made, not to conceal, or destroy the apple;
but to adorn, and preserve it.31 The picture was made for the applenot the apple for the picture.
Thus, for Bimey, Lincoln, and many others who advocated for the
prevention of slavery's spread and for the gradual emancipation of slaves
where it was already established, the Declaration of Independence
proclaimed the motivating principle, the natural law impetus, behind the

28. Id. at 72-73 (quotations omitted).
29. Id.
30.

For further discussion of Lincoln's use of the Declaration, see ALLEN C.

GUELZO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: REDEEMER PRESIDENT 191-98 (1999).

31. Abraham Lincoln, Fragment on the Constitution and the Union, in IV THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 168-69 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (emphases
deleted).
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establishment of the United States. Although slavery was recognized in
the Constitution, this was a compromise made to secure union among the
states. Thus, the Constitution allowed slavery, but it was drafted with a
view towards slavery's ultimate demise.32

Some abolitionists did not think Lincoln and the other "gradualists"
went far enough in their approach to ending slavery. For these
abolitionists, not only was slavery inconsistent with the founding natural
law principles of the United States expressed in the Declaration, but the
federal government was legally prohibited from recognizing slavery.
According to Joshua R. Giddings, since many of the Founding Fathers
abhorred slavery they were careful not to put anything in the Constitution
which legitimated it. 33 Giddings did not go so far as to say that the
Declaration and the Constitution abolished slavery within the slave
states, but he was willing to say that the federal government could not
34
constitutionally aid the slave states in recovering escaped slaves.
Doing so would imply that the federal government considered slaves to
be property, which Giddings found to be inconsistent with the principles
of the Declaration that the Constitution was drafted to secure.35
Abolitionist Lysander Spooner went further than Giddings in his
views on the Declaration's effect on slavery. Spooner published a book
in 1845 entitled, The Unconstitutionality of Slavery.36 He started by
focusing on the Declaration's phrase, "self-evident truth." He argued
that all "self-evident truths" are necessarily incorporated into all
"constitutions, compacts and systems of government," if only by
implication.3 7 This is so, because it is impossible "to enumerate all the
'self-evident truths' which must be acted upon in the administration of
law."38 Therefore, such truths are "all taken for granted, unless particular
ones" are expressly denied. 39 Provided that it is a "self-evident truth"

32. PHILIP S. PALUDAN, A CRISIS OF REPUBLICANISM: AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE
CIVIL WAR ERA 77-79 (Lloyd E. Ambrosius ed., 1990).
33. Joshua R. Giddings, Paymentfor Slaves, Speech of Mr. J.R. Giddings, of Ohio,
on the Bill to Pay the Heirs of Antonio Pacheco for Slaves Sent West of the Mississippi
with the Seminole Indians in 1838, 1-5 (Buell & Blanchard 1849), available at
see also ALBERT
http://dlxs.library.comell.edu/m/mayantislavery/browse_G.html;
BUSHNELL HART, AMERICAN STATESMEN: SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 65 (Houghton
Mifflin Co. 1899).

34.
35.

Giddings, supra note 33.
Id.

36. LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY 42 (Bela Marsh
For a review of Spooner's arguments and his theory of constitutional
1845).
interpretation see Randy E. Barnett, Was Slavery UnconstitutionalBefore the Thirteenth
Amendment?: Lysander Spooner's Theory of Interpretation,28 PAC. L.J. 977 (1996).
37. SPOONER, supra note 36, at 37.

38.
39.

Id. at 43.
Id.
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that "all men have a natural and inalienable right to life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness, that truth constitutes a part of all our laws and all
our constitutions, unless it has been unequivocally and authoritatively
denied., 40 Spooner went on to argue that this truth had never been
denied by any law or constitution in the United States.4' Thus, in
Spooner's mind, the natural law principles elucidated in the Declaration
were incorporated into the Constitution by default.42
Other abolitionists appealed to the Declaration to justify their
willingness to sacrifice the Union and the Constitution in order to reach
their ultimate goal of immediate and unconditional emancipation.43 For
example, Fredrick Douglass referred to the Declaration in a speech at
Rochester, New York, to observe American independence.44 Douglass
did not discuss the legal effect of the Declaration or its interaction with
the Constitution.45 Instead, Douglass' references to the Declaration were
made to point out the two-facedness of the American people.46 His
argument against slavery was moral, and the Declaration was useful to
him because the principles it declared were inconsistent with slavery and

40. Id. at 44.
41. Id.
42. Spooner offered a second argument why slavery was unconstitutional. He began
with the proposition that the Declaration was "the constitutional law of this country for
certain purposes" which included absolving "people from their allegiance to the English
crown." SPOONER, supra note 36, at 42. Thus, if it was constitutional law for that
purpose, it must also be such for the "purpose of recognizing and establishing, as law, the
natural and inalienable right of individuals to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness [.1"
SPOONER, supra note 36, at 42. In his mind, since the separation from England was
lawful because of the Declaration, the principles it referred to in order to legalize the act
must have been law. Spooner continued:
It is sufficient for our purpose, if it be admitted that this principle was the law
of the country at that particular time, (1 776)-even though it had continued to
be the law only for a year, or even a day. For if it were the law of the country
even for a day, it freed every slave in the country-(if there were, as we say
there were not, any legal slaves then in the country.) And the burden would
then be upon the slaveholder to show that slavery had since been
constitutionally established. And to show this, he must show an express
constitutional designation of the particular individuals, who have since been
made slaves. Without such particular designation of the individuals to be made
slaves, (and not even the present constitutions of the slave States make any
designation,) all constitutional provisions, purporting to authorize slavery, are
indefinite, and uncertain in their application, and for that reason void.
SPOONER, supra note 36, at 42-43.
43. See WILLIAM S. MCFEELY, FREDERICK DOUGLASS 192 (Norton 1991) (describing
an 1849 speech where Douglass "endorse[d] violence"); see also id. at 211.
44. Frederick Douglass, What to the Slave is the Fourth of July? (1852), in
AUTOBIOGRAPHIEs 431-35 (Penguin Books USA 1994).
45. See id. at 432.
46. See id. ("I do not hesitate to declare, with all my soul, that the character and
conduct of this nation never looked blacker to me than on this Fourth of July.").
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made Americans look like base hypocrites. 47 According to Douglass, the
Union's accommodation of slavery justified its dissolution.48
Like Douglass, abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison appealed to the
Declaration to justify dissolution of the Union.49 Garrison did not use the
Declaration to reinterpret the Constitution or search for antislavery
He regarded this as "naive
principles behind the Constitution.5 0
Instead, Garrison
wordplay or deceptive political contrivance.'
compact:
the
entire
constitutional
rejected
By the infamous bargain which the [Founders] made between
themselves, they virtually dethroned the Most High God, and
trampled beneath their feet their own solemn and heaven-attested
Declaration, that all men are created equal, and endowed by their
Creator with certain inalienable rights-among which are life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness. They had no lawful power to bind
themselves, or their posterity, for one hour-for one moment-by
A sacred compact!
such an unholy alliance.... A sacred compact!
52
What, then, is wicked and ignominious?
For Garrison, the principles elucidated in the Declaration of
Independence rendered the Constitution and its compromise with slavery
illegitimate. 3
Women's Suffrage Movement

3.

About the time the antislavery movement reached its peak, the spirit
of reformism it fostered led to the birth of the women's suffrage
movement.5 4 As with the abolitionist movement, there was a spectrum of
views among the suffragettes regarding the Declaration. Some used the
Declaration as rhetorical and moral support for their arguments, while
47. See id. at 434 ("To him, your celebration is a sham; your boasted liberty, an
unholy license; your national greatness, swelling vanity; your sounds of rejoicing are
empty and heartless; your denunciations of tyrants, brass-fronted impudence; your shouts
of liberty and equality, hollow mockery ...").
48. Douglass later recanted his goal of dissolution. FREDERICK DOUGLASS, LIFE AND
TIMES OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, in AUTOBIOGRAPHIES, supra note 44, at 704-05.
49. See William Lloyd Garrison, Address to the Colonization Society (July 4, 1829),
available at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document-562.
50.

See

HENRY MAYER,

ALL ON FIRE:

WILLIAM

LLOYD GARRISON AND THE

ABOLITION OF SLAVERY 326-27 (St. Martin's Press 1998).

51.
52.

Id.
William Lloyd Garrison, On the Constitution and the Union, The Liberator,

December 29, 1832, at 207, available at http://www.fair-use.org/the-liberator/1832/

12/29/on-the-constitution-and-the-union.
53. See id.
54. See JUDITH E. HARPER, SUSAN B. ANTHONY: A BIOGRAPHICAL COMPANION 8-9
(ABC-CLIO, Inc. 1998) (recounting Susan B. Anthony's life as passionate abolitionist
and the merging of the fight for abolition and women's suffrage).
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others saw it as an independent source of binding constitutional
principles. 55 Although the women's suffrage movement sought a
constitutional amendment to secure their right to vote, a significant
portion of the suffragettes believed such an amendment was legally
unnecessary because the Constitution already recognized such a right
because of the Declaration.56
The first major event in the women's suffrage movement was the
Seneca Falls Convention of 1848.57 For the convention, Elizabeth Cady
Stanton drafted a Declaration of Sentiments,58 the preamble of which
parroted the Declaration but with the addition of "women.,

59

Its

preamble was followed by eighteen grievances against "man," which was
the same number advanced against the British King in the original
Declaration. 60 The Declaration of Sentiments ended with a demand for
equal "rights and privileges" for women.6 1
Not only did the women's suffrage advocates utilize arguments
based on the principles of the Declaration to gain moral and political
legitimacy in their fight to amend the Constitution,6 2 but many also
considered the Declaration to be the key to interpreting the
Constitution.63 For many advocates, amending the Constitution to secure
women's right to vote was unnecessary. 64 This was because Stanton and
other women's rights advocates were influenced by abolitionist Lysander
Spooner's theory of constitutional interpretation.
The speeches of Susan B. Anthony, especially her Declaration of
the Rights of Woman, exemplify this view of the interaction between the
Constitution and the Declaration. She delivered her declaration outside
of Independence Hall in Philadelphia during the Centennial Exposition
55. Susan B. Anthony, Is it a Crimefor a United States Citizen to Vote? (1873), in
HARPER, supra note 54, at 278-285.
56. Id.
57.

ELLEN CAROL DuBois, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN

INDEPENDENT WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1848-1869, at 23 (Cornell University
Press 1978).
58. ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, A HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 1 70-71 (Stanton
et al. eds., Fowler & Wells 1881), availableat http://www.closeup.org/sentimnt.htm.
59. Id.
60.

BRUCE MIROFF,

ICONS OF DEMOCRACY:

AMERICAN LEADERS

AS HEROS,

ARISTOCRATS, DISSENTERS, AND DEMOCRATS 130 (University Press of Kansas 2000)
(1993).
61. STANTON, supra note 58,at 70-71.
62. LINDA K. KERBER, No CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE
OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 81-92 (Hill & Wang 1998) (recounting the campaign by
Abby and Julia Smith who refused to pay their taxes in 1869 because they were paying
higher taxes than all of their neighbors but without a vote in taxation decisions).
63. Susan B. Anthony, Declaration of the Rights of Woman (July 4, 1876), in
HARPER, supra note 54, at 287-90.
64. See HARPER, supra note 54, at 278-285.
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of July 4, 1876.65 Anthony argued that the natural law principles
elucidated in the Declaration were the animating principles behind the
Constitution and that these principles secured the right to vote for all
citizens, including women.66 Anthony more explicitly stated this view in
a speech she gave prior to her trial for unlawfully voting in an election.67
4.

Civil Rights Movement

The civil rights movement was born to secure for newly-freed black
Americans the same rights and privileges enjoyed by whites. 68 It drew
its inspiration from the Declaration of Independence, which had given
impetus to the movement to end slavery and which propelled the
women's suffrage movement, especially in the beginning. 69 However,
historical circumstances were such that over time clearly recognized
laws, including the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act,
eclipsed the Declaration in legal arguments made in support of the
modem civil rights movement.70 While some proponents of the modem
civil rights movement believed that the Declaration constituted binding
constitutional law, or at least contained foundational principles that the
Constitution was drafted to secure, references to the Declaration were
relatively less frequent. 7 1 Furthermore, the Declaration no longer
constituted the primary basis of the argument for the legal reforms

65.

Id. at 68.

66.
67.

Id. at 287-90.
Id. at 278-285; see also AN ACCOUNT OF THE PROCEEDINGS ON THE TRIAL OF

SUSAN B. ANTHONY, ON THE CHARGE OF ILLEGAL VOTING, AT THE PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION IN Nov. 1872 AND ON THE TRIAL OF BEVERLY W. JONES, EDWIN T. MARSH AND
WILLIAM B. HALL, THE INSPECTORS OF ELECTION BY WHOM HER VOTE WAS RECEIVED 1837 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2002) (giving Anthony's attorney's arguments that the
court should use the Declaration to interpret the Constitution).
68. See CLAUDE H. NOLEN, AFRICAN AMERICAN SOUTHERNERS IN SLAVERY, CIVIL
WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 156 (McFarland & Company, Inc. 2001).
69. Id. Senator Charles Sumner was a strong proponent of black civil rights and
frequently relied on the Declaration to bolster his legal arguments regarding the meaning
of the Constitution and Congress' authority to implement civil rights legislation. See,
e.g., Charles Sumner quoted in Jasper B. Shannon, Political Obstacles to Civil Rights
Legislation, 275 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 53, 54 (May 1951) (arguing that
the right to vote for blacks was essential because of the Declaration's proclamation that
just government is based on consent); Ronald B. Jager, CharlesSumner, the Constitution,
and the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 42 NEW ENG. Q. 350, 365 (Sept. 1969) (stating that
Sumner considered the Declaration to be a "guiding rule for interpretation of the
Constitution").
70. JAMES E. BOND, No EASY WALK TO FREEDOM: RECONSTRUCTION AND THE
RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 54, 57-58, 78-81 (Praeger 1997) (citing
various instances of proponents of the civil rights movement relying on the Civil Rights
Act and the Fourteenth Amendment as authority).
71. Jasper B. Shannon, PoliticalObstacles to Civil Rights Legislation, 275 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 53, 58 (May 1951).
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advocated by civil rights activists.72
In the political arena during the era of the modem civil rights
movement, civil rights were often tied to the Declaration's promise of
equality. The civil rights plank in the Republican platform of 1948 relied
on the Declaration:
One of the basic principles of this Republic is the equality of all
individuals in their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
This principle is enunciated in the Declaration of Independence and
embodied in the Constitution of the United States; it was vindicated
on the field of battle and became the cornerstone of this Republic.
This right of equal opportunity to work and advance in life should
never be limited in
73 any individual because of race, religion, color, or
country of origin.
In addition, President Harry Truman referred to this promise of equality
in a commencement address he delivered at Howard University:
Our country is founded on the proposition that all men are created
equal. This means that they should be equal before the law. They
should enjoy equal political rights. And they should have equal
opportunities for education, employment, and decent living
conditions. This is our belief, and we know it is right. We know it is
morally right....

Our Federal Government must live up to the ideals professed in the
Declaration of Independence and the duties imposed upon it by the
Constitution. The full force and power of the Federal Government
must stand behind
the protection of rights guaranteed in the Federal
74
Constitution.

Likewise, civil rights leaders argued that the Declaration contained
the nation's founding ideals. Martin Luther King, Jr., considered the
Declaration of Independence to be an "unparalleled document
proclaiming 'profoundly and eloquently the sacredness of human
personality. ,,75 As a result, King often referred to the Declaration in
72. See generally, Joseph H. Taylor, The FourteenthAmendment, the Negro, and the
Spirit of the Times, 45 81 J. NEGRO HIST. (Jan. 1960) (describing the evolution of the
Fourteenth Amendment in Supreme Court decisions and its basis as the Court's means of
disavowing the separate but equal doctrine).
73. Shannon, supra note 71, at53, 58.
74. President Harry S. Truman, Commencement Address at Howard University
(June 13, 1952), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid= 14160
&st-&stl = .
75. Mary Frances Berry, Vindicating Martin Luther King, Jr.: The Road to a Color-
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speeches and writings. For example, when a group of black and white
students demonstrated against department store lunch counter
discrimination, King 76compared the actions of those students to those of
America's Founders:
A revolution is occurring in both the social order and the human
mind. One hundred eighty-four years ago a bold group of men
signed the Declaration of Independence. If their struggle had been
lost they had signed their own death warrant. Nevertheless, though
explicitly regretting that King George had forced them to this
extreme by a long "train of abuses," they resolutely acted and a great
new society was born. The Negro students, their parents, and their
allies are acting today in that imperishable tradition.
King saw the students as acting within the same revolutionary tradition
as America's Founding Fathers.78
Given the references to the Declaration by influential civil rights
proponents, it is clear the civil rights movement still looked to the
Declaration for inspiration and support. But when compared to the
references by Radical Republicans during Reconstruction, it is also clear
that the role played by the Declaration had changed. Modem references
to the Declaration were generally made to elicit the nation's founding
principles and provide moral and philosophical support to the proposed
reforms and/or political programs. 79 I believe this was because of the
adoption of laws that provided more plausible legal claims for civil rights
than did the previous appeals to the Declaration.8 °
The Fourteenth Amendment became the primary constitutional
vehicle for securing African
Americans'
civil rights
after
Reconstruction.8 1 It was meant to establish the freedmen's civil rights
more securely than previous legislation, and it provided constitutional
authorization for further civil rights legislation to enforce the equality

Blind Society, 81 J. NEGRO HIST. 137, 141 (Winter-Autumn 1996).
76.

See A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING,

JR. 94, 98 (James Melvin Washington ed., Harper & Row 1986) [hereinafter A
TESTAMENT OF HOPE].

77. Martin Luther King, Jr., The Burning Truth in the South (1960), in A TESTAMENT
OF HOPE, supra note 76, at 98.
78. In his famous I Have a Dream speech, King used the Declaration as the standard
against which to judge contemporary American life and the ideal toward which America
should strive. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream (1963), in A TESTAMENT OF
HOPE, supra note 76, at 217.
79. A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 76.
80. See MAIER, supra note 11, at 214 (stating that the Reconstruction Amendments,
"in some measure," incorporated the Declaration's principle of equality).
81. See HowARD N. MEYER, THE AMENDMENT THAT REFUSED TO DIE 56-60 (Chilton
Book Co. 1973).
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promised by the Amendment.82 Thus, as Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence developed and civil rights activists began to realize its
potential to aid their cause, the need to rely on the Declaration for legal
support diminished.
In the legal arena, opponents of segregation viewed the change
similarly. In its amicus brief in Sweatt v. Painter,the Committee of Law
Teachers Against Segregation in Legal Education provided a discussion
of the Equal Protection Clause's origin that tied it to the Declaration:
First, analysis of the origins of "equal protection" in American law
shows that, in the form of "equality before the law," it was
transferred to this country from the French by Charles Sumner as part
of his attack on segregated education in Massachusetts a decade
before the Civil War, and linked by him with the Declaration of
Independence. Popularized by Sumner, it or like phrases became the
slogan of the abolitionists, and it passed into the Constitution as an
important part of the abolitionists' share of the Civil War victory....

It was one thing, and a very important one, to declare as a political
abstraction that "all men are created equal," and quite another to
attach concrete rights to this state of equality. The Declaration of
Independence did the former. The latter was Charles Sumner's
outstanding contribution to American law.... 83
Based on this history of the drafting of the Equal Protection Clause, it
would be less productive for the civil rights movement to attempt to
stretch constitutional jurisprudence to the point of saying that the
Declaration is a part of America's constitutional law when one could
point directly to a provision of the Constitution which guaranteed "equal
protection of the law."
Although adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment largely
diminished the need for civil rights activists to refer to the Declaration in
their legal arguments,84 they continued to utilize it as the American ideal
that American law should strive to realize. The briefs submitted in
82. Id. at 56.
83. Brief for the Committee of Law Teachers Against Segregation in Legal
Education as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3,11, Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629
(1950) (No. 44).
84. See Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of
the State of Texas at 20, Sweatt, 339 U.S. 629; Brief for the American Veterans
Committee, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 21, Sweatt, 339 U.S. 629; Brief
for Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 7-9, Sweatt, 339 U.S. 629, all of which rely solely on the Fourteenth
Amendment.
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Brown v. Board of Education85 exemplify this aspirational rather than
legal use of the Declaration. One brief began by intoning that our
"democratic society is founded on the belief that all men are equal and
capable of governing themselves., 86 It held further that men create the
institutions of government for the purpose of safeguarding their rights of
"life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."8 7 It went on to connect this
ideal to Brown:
A decision outlawing segregation in education on the elementary and
secondary level will not only advance the educational opportunities

of both whites and Negroes in the South, but it will also give
convincing evidence to millions in Asia and Africa that the United
States is willing to give more than lip service to the principles on

which it is founded.

Thus, the Declaration was referred to in the legal arguments of the
modem civil rights movement, but primarily as an expression of the
founding principles of America and not as a source of constitutional law.
5.

Pro-life Movement

As with earlier social reform movements, members of the pro-life
movement rely extensively on the Declaration. And similar to those
earlier movements, they also use the Declaration for various purposes:
most use it to support moral arguments against abortion; some view the
Declaration as having a unique role to play in constitutional
interpretation; and some argue that the Declaration is itself a source of
89
independently-binding constitutional law.
The majority of references to the Declaration by pro-lifers are
moral. Religious leaders, and especially political activists, refer to the
85.

349 U.S. 294 (1955) (No. 1).

86.

Brief of American Federation of Teachers as Amicus Curiae at 3, Brown v. Bd.

of Educ. of Topeka, Kan. 3, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (No. 1).

87.
88.

Id.
Id. at 14; see also Brief of Petitioner (Boiling) at 26, Brown, 349 U.S. 294

(citation omitted):

This Court, in the Cummings case, said at pages 321-322: "The theory upon
which our political institutions rest is, that all men have certain inalienable
rights-that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and that
in the pursuit of happiness all avocations, all honors, all positions, are alike
open to everyone, and that in the protection of these rights all are equal before
the law."
89. See Michele Dillon, Religion and Culture in Tension: The Abortion Discourses
of the U.S. Catholic Bishops and the Southern Baptist Convention, 5 RELIGION AND AM.
CULTURE 159, 169-71 (Summer 1995), Paolo Torzilli, Reconciling the Sanctity of Human
Life, the Declarationof Independence, and the Constitution, 40 CATH. LAW. 197, 201-02
(2000), Lewis E. Lehrman, The Right to Life and the Restoration of the American
Republic, 38 NAT'L REV. 25, 26 (Aug. 29, 1986).
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Declaration to support their primarily moral and political arguments
against abortion. A good example of this is the document, We Hold
These Truths: A Statement of Christian Conscience and Citizenship,
which was patterned after the Declaration and released on July Fourth. 90
This Statement was signed by forty-six persons who represented
Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant churches and communities, as well as
The
the leaders of various religious and political organizations. 91
signers, quoting the Declaration, "agreed that-whether the question be
protection of the unborn, providing for the poor, restoring the family, or
into greater
racial justice-we can and must bring law and public policy
92
God.'
nature's
of
and
nature
of
'laws
the
harmony with
The Catholic Church has been especially active in the fight against
abortion, and Catholic leaders often refer to the Declaration in their
efforts to reach the wider culture through moral persuasion. 93 Catholics,
of course, are not the only religious group to refer to the Declaration of
Southern Baptist
Independence in their arguments against abortion. The
94
Convention, for example, also utilizes the Declaration.
Political leaders also frequently reference the Declaration in their
moral arguments against abortion. President Ronald Reagan wrote:
I have no trouble identifying the answer our nation has always given
to this basic question [whether to embrace all human life], and the
answer that I hope and pray it will give in the future. America was
founded by men and women who shared a vision of the value of each
and every individual. They stated this vision clearly from the very
start in the Declaration of Independence, using words that every
95
schoolboy and schoolgirl can recite ....
President Reagan invoked Abraham Lincoln's use of the Declaration to

90.

Symposium, We Hold These Truths: A Statement of Christian Conscience and

Citizenship, 76 FIRST THINGS 51-54 (October 1997).

91.
92.
93.

Id.at 54.
Id.
Dillon, supra note 89; see also Testimony of United States Catholic Conference

on Constitutional Amendments Protecting Unborn Human Life Before the SubCommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary
(Mar. 24, 1976), available at http://www.priestsforlife.org/magisterium/bishops/76-03-

24uscchousecommittee.htm; Testimony of United States Catholic Conference on
Constitutional Amendment Protecting Unborn Human Life Before the Sub-Committee on
Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Mar. 7, 1974),
available at http://www.priestsforlife.org/magisterium/bishops/74-03-07ussctestimony.

htm.
94.

Sarah Jane Head, Abortion, http://www.erlc.com/erlc/article/abortion (last visited

Mar. 13, 2006) (citing LARRY K LEWIS, CRITICAL ISSUES: WHAT THE BIBLE TEACHES

ABOUT ABORTION (Southern Baptist Convention Christian Life Commission, 1990)).
95. RONALD REAGAN, ABORTION AND THE CONSCIENCE OF THE NATION 27 (Thomas
Nelson Publishers 1984).

2006]

ORIGINALISM, THE DECLARATION AND INDEPENDENCE

429

remind Americans of their heritage of supporting human rights for all
people.9 6 This use of the Declaration is also evident in Reagan's
PersonhoodProclamation,which he issued as President.9 7
While most pro-life advocates confine their use of the Declaration
to moral arguments, some look to the Declaration to further their
constitutional arguments against abortion. They view the Declaration as
the document which declares America's founding principles and
consequently utilize it to interpret various provisions of the Constitution.
For example, Paolo Torzilli argues that the Constitution should be
interpreted with the aid of the Declaration because it articulated the
nation's founding principles.9 8 He asserts that "the Framers intended that
the Constitution protect the tenets set forth in the Declaration of
Independence" and that a "fair interpretation of the Constitution should
not violate the purpose upon which our Nation was founded." 99 Torzilli

then determines that the "privacy rationale" given for abortion
"disappears" because abortion "jeopardizes the unalienable right to
life."' 00 For Torzilli, abortion should be dealt with by appointing judges
who will interpret the Due Process Clauses to protect the "unalienable
rights" guaranteed in the Declaration.' 0'
A prominent pro-lifer, Hadley Arkes, also refers to the Declaration
of Independence in his arguments against the constitutionality of
legalized abortion. 10 2 Arkes bases his arguments on the proposition that
the American constitutional order was founded to secure man's natural
rights as announced in the Declaration.' 0 3 He then shows how the
04
judiciary has abandoned these founding principles in its jurisprudence. 1
96. Id. at 27-28.
97. See Proclamation No. 5761, 53 Fed. Reg. 1464-65 (Jan. 19, 1988) (invoking the
Declaration).
98.

Paolo Torzilli, Reconciling the Sanctity of Human Life, the Declaration of

Independence, and the Constitution, 40 CATH. LAW. 197, 201-02 (2000).
99. Id. at 201.
100. Id. at 217.
101. Id. at 225-26. A similar argument was made by Kelly Hollowell. She begins by
noting that the Fourteenth Amendment grants "substantial rights to persons." Kelly J.
Hollowell, Defining a Person Under the FourteenthAmendment: A Constitutionally and

Scientifically Based Analysis, 14 REGENT U. L. REv. 67, 68 (2001). To define the word
"person" for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, Hollowell turns to the Declaration.
Id. at 72. She makes the historical argument that the Constitution embodied the
Declaration's "natural law principles," and hence that a "person" within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment should possess the Declaration's unalienable right to life. Id.
at 72-74.
102. See HADLEY ARKEs, NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE 20-26, 44
(2002).
103. See HADLEY ARKES, BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION 40-46 (1990) (arguing that the

Constitution was the means of implementing the Declaration's principles).
104. For in the course of defending this new "right" to abortion, the [courts] have
talked themselves out of the notion of "natural rights" held by Lincoln and the
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Thus, in Arkes' thinking, abortion violates the natural rights of the
were to be secured by the government as declared in
unborn child which
10 5
the Declaration.

A minority of pro-lifers are more radical and argue there is no need
to appeal to the text of the Constitution at all. They are satisfied that if
abortion violates a fundamental right declared in the Declaration, then
the procedure itself is unconstitutional. One of the first major proponents
of this view was Lewis Lehrman:
Thirteen years ago, in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court overthrew the
common law of centuries and the statute law of fifty states,
authorized abortion on demand, and thereby severed the child-aboutto-be-born from the Declaration of Independence. It was in the
Declaration, the organic law of the American Founding, that the
Fathers of our country proclaimed the self-evident truths of our
fundamental moral and constitutional law.... It was this original
Roe, without
charter of the nation that the Supreme Court violated 1in
06
even the mandate of an election or a vote in Congress.
Lehrman considered the Declaration to constitute a law 0 7more
fundamental to the American Republic than even the Constitution.
A similar argument against abortion is made by Mark Trapp who
American Founders. But that understanding was absolutely necessary to the
Constitution in the sense that, without it, one could not give a coherent account
of the Constitution or the "rights" it was meant to secure. The partisans of
abortion have meant to establish an expansive notion of rights; but the
requirements of their own argument have compelled them to evacuate from the
logic of "rights" its deepest meaning. In order to defend that right to abortion,
they were compelled to reject the deep logic of "natural rights," for that logic
would envelop even the child with rights as soon as the child begins to be. The
partisans of abortion were driven then to put, in the place of natural rights, a
rather diminished version of rights. But with that logic, or with that diminished
notion of "rights," the partisans of the "right to abortion" cannot protect any
longer my life, my freedoms, my rights, against the most arbitrary takings and
restrictions. For the defenders of abortion have removed the moral ground for
the definition and defense of any of those rights.
ARKE, supra note 102, at 173; see also id. at 112-46.
105. See also Clarence Thomas, Toward a "Plain Reading" of the Constitution-The
Declaration of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 How. L. J. 983, 984,
986, 991-92, 994 (1987) ("The proper way to interpret the Civil War amendments is as
extensions of the promise of the original Constitution which in turn was intended to fulfill
the promise of the Declaration.") For a similar discussion, see also Clarence Thomas,
The Higher Law Background of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 12 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 63, 64-68 (1989) (discussing the Privileges and
Immunities Clauses and civil rights through the lens of the Declaration of Independence).
106. Lewis E. Lehrman, The Right to Life and the Restoration of the American
Republic, 38 NAT'L REV. 25, 26 (Aug. 29, 1986).
107. Id. at 28; see also Lewis E. Lehrman, The Declarationof Independence and the
Right to Life: One Leads Unmistakably from the Other, AM. SPECTATOR, Apr. 1987, at
22, 22-23 (making the same argument).
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claims that the Constitution "was meant to incorporate the principles of
the Declaration."'' 0 8 Trapp uses history to establish that the Declaration
is incorporated into American constitutional law. 10 9 For Trapp, the
Declaration constitutes fundamental law that the Constitution
incorporated, and because the unborn are "created" at conception and
abortion violates this "created" human's right to life, it is
unconstitutional. " 0
6.

Summary

In this subsection I have reviewed the changing fortunes of the
Declaration through American history. In the immediate aftermath of the
Revolution, the Declaration fell out of the public's consciousness only to
be resurrected by social reform movements that have used it for a variety
of purposes. Below,"' I return to this topic and compare use of the
Declaration by today's Declarationists to its use by social reformers.
C. Divergent Modern Claims in ConstitutionalInterpretation
Regardingthe Role and Impact of the Declaration
The amount of scholarly work in the field of constitutional
interpretation is staggering-and constantly growing. Despite this
enormous outpouring of scholarly effort, most constitutional scholars pay
little, if any, attention to the role of the Declaration. As Professor Scott
Gerber has noted, the Declaration "is now all but ignored." ' 12 A short
review of the writings of major scholars in the area confirms Gerber's
observation."13
108. Mark Trapp, CreatedEqual: How the Declarationof Independence Recognizes
and Guaranteesthe Right to Life for the Unborn, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 819, 831 (2001).
109. See id. at 832-45.
110. Id.at 845.
Il1.

See infra Part III.B.1.c.

112. GERBER, supra note 1, at 2; see also Carlton F.W. Larson, The Declaration of
Independence: A 225th Re-Interpretation, 76 WASH. L. REV. 701, 705 (2001) ("[T]he
position of the Declaration of Independence in recent constitutional thought is one of
utter and complete irrelevance.").
113. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004) [hereinafter BARNETT] (making no reference to the

Declaration); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW (1990) (making no reference to the Declaration) [hereinafter BORK]; RONALD
DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 315,
318 (1996) [hereinafter DwoRKiN, FREEDOM'S LAW] (noting only Justice Thomas'
references to the Declaration); RICHARD F. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE
CONSTITUTION (2001) (making no reference to the Declaration); SCALIA, supra note 7, at

134 (distinguishing between the "practical" Constitution and the "aspiration[al]"
Declaration);

KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,

CONSTITUTIONAL

MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

(1999)

INTERPRETATION:

TEXTUAL

(making no reference

to the
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originalists

and

--come to varying conclusions regarding the role the

Declaration should play in constitutional interpretation.
1. Divergent Scholarly Claims Regarding the Role of the
Declaration in Constitutional Interpretation
a.

No Role

The vast majority of scholars, including the vast majority of
originalist scholars, do not include any unique role for the Declaration in
constitutional interpretation.
Leading originalists, such as Justice
Scalia, 115 Robert Bork,' 16 Randy Barnett,'1 17 and Keith Whittington,'1 18 all
find no special role for the Declaration. Other constitutional scholars
who are not (or at least not entirely) originalists, such as Bruce
122
12 1
120
John Hart Ely,
Ronald Dworkin,
Ackerman, 119 Justice Breyer,

Richard
Fallon,' 23 and Larry Kramer, 124 likewise do not find a role for
the Declaration. 125

Declaration).
114. For a short explanation of the differences between originalists and
nonoriginalists, see Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism,
NonoriginalistPrecedent,and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L. REV. 419, 424-28 (2006)
[hereinafter Strang Originalist].
115. See SCALIA, supra note 7.
116. See BORK, supra note 113 (omitting discussion of the Declaration within
constitutional analysis).
117. See BARNETT, supra note 113 (omitting discussion of the Declaration within
constitutional analysis).
118. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 113 (omitting discussion of the Declaration within
constitutional analysis).
119. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) (finding the
Declaration plays no special role in modem constitutional analysis).
120. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION (2005) (omitting discussion of the Declaration within constitutional
analysis).
121. See DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 113; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S
EMPIRE (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE] (omitting discussion of the
Declaration within constitutional analysis).
122.

See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL

REVIEW (1980) (finding the Declaration plays no special role in modem constitutional
analysis).
123. See FALLON, supra note 113 (omitting discussion of the Declaration within
constitutional analysis).
124. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 7-8 (2004) (discussing the aspects of modem constitutional
interpretation sans the Declaration).
125. Lawrence Tribe only refers twice to the Declaration in his constitutional law
treatise. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 40, 74-75 (3d ed. 2000).
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What arguments do scholars who find no role for the Declaration in

constitutional interpretation give for their position? Generally, most give
126
no argument because the Declaration is simply not on their horizon.
Larry Kramer, for example, argues that "the people themselves" should
have the "central and pivotal role" in implementing and interpreting the
Constitution. 127 He describes the Declaration in historical context, as the
means of separating from England, but beyond that he does
not describe
28
a role for the Declaration in constitutional interpretation.1
Ronald Dworkin's method of constitutional interpretation also gives
no role to the Declaration. He argues that the proper interpretation of the
Constitution must fit our constitutional legal practice-text, history, and
precedent-and then justify that practice. 129 Dworkin does not explicitly
address the Declaration and, given the absence of any role for the
Declaration in our constitutional legal practice, Dworkin's lack of
reference to the Declaration is explainable by the fact that employing the
Declaration in constitutional interpretation does not fit our constitutional
legal practice.
A few scholars do provide short substantive arguments why the
Declaration should not play a role in constitutional interpretation. John
Hart Ely has argued that appeals to the natural law ideals said to be
contained in the Declaration are misplaced for a number of reasons,
including "the critical difference in function" between the Declaration
and the Constitution. 30 The Declaration, according to Ely, was an
argument justifying independence of the colonies, while the Constitution
was "a frame of government. ' ' 131 Ely argued that the Constitution did not
contain a place for natural law because of its different function and
because of the lack of agreement regarding natural law at the time of the
126.

See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 119, at 6-7, 142, 213, 216 (explaining his

concept of dualist democracy and noting the Declaration in its historical context);
BARNETT, supra note 113, at 89-113 (describing his originalist methodology without
reference to the Declaration); Randy E. Barnett, James Madison's Ninth Amendment, in
THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH

AMENDMENT 1-51 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989) (same); BORK, supra note 113, at 143-60

(explaining his originalist methodology without noting the Declaration); BREYER, supra
note 120, at 3-34 (describing his interpretative "theme" of "active liberty" without noting
a role for the Declaration); FALLON, supra note 113, at 4-12 (discussing his view of how
the Supreme Court should "implement" the Constitution with no discussion of the
Declaration);

WHITTINGTON,

supra note

113,

at 5-14 (explaining

his originalist

interpretative methodology without reference to the Declaration).
127.
128.
129.

KRAMER, supra note 124, at 8.
See KRAMER, supra note 124, at 6, 36-39, 41.
See, e.g., DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 113, at 8-12 (applying his fit

and justification methodology to the Equal Protection Clause); DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE,
supra note 121, at 355-99 (applying his interpretative methodology to the Constitution).
130. ELY, supranote 122, at 49.
131.

Id.
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Framing and Ratification.132 Justice Scalia, as noted in the Introduction,
claims because of the different purposes
is also critical of Declarationist
33
1
documents.
of the
Robert Bork has engaged in more extended debate over the
Declaration's role. In a number of smaller writings Bork has argued
against Declarationist scholars such as Harry V. Jaffa. In a review of
Jaffa's book, Original Intent and the Framers of the Constitution, Bork
contended that Jaffa's argument was identical to arguments put forward
by his (Jaffa's) liberal antagonists in that both find their "heart's desire"
in the Constitution. 134 Bork maintained that the rights protected in the
Constitution are the result, not of natural law theorizing, but rather of the
particular historical circumstances and common law history of the United
States.135 Hence, the references to natural law in the Declaration provide
no aid to interpreting the Constitution. 136 Further, Bork argued that the
natural law terms in the Declaration's second paragraph, such as "equal,"
provide "little guidance for constitutional interpretation.' ' 137 Lastly, Bork
put forward the inconsistencies between the Declaration's affirmation of
equality and the Constitution's accommodation of38slavery, which the
southern states required as a condition to the Union.'
b.

Some Role

Another, smaller group of scholars gives some role to the
Declaration in constitutional interpretation, although just what that role
is-and its extent-are often left unclear. The constitutional law
casebook edited by Douglas Kmiec, Stephen Presser, John Eastman, and
Raymond Marcin devotes a section to the role of the Declaration in
constitutional interpretation. 139 The section entitled "The Declarationof
Independence-A Summary ofAmerican FundamentalPrinciple,"argues
that the natural law principles "embedded within the Declaration have
The editors claim that the Declaration's
continuing validity."' 140
placement in the U.S. Code supports this conclusion, along with the
background views of the Framers regarding natural law and the

132.
133.

Id.
SCALIA, supra note

7, at 134.

134.

Robert H. Bork, OriginalIntent and the Framersof the Constitution: A Disputed
Question, NATIONAL REVIEW, Feb. 7, 1994 (book review).

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
DOUGLAS W. KMIEC ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORY,

CASES, AND PHILOSOPHY 100-14 (2d ed. 2004).

140.

Seeid. at 101-14.

2006]

ORIGINALISM, THE DECLARATION AND INDEPENDENCE

435

Declaration's relationship to the Constitution.14 ' The editors, however,
do not provide guidance as to how, practically, the Declaration should
influence constitutional interpretation and instead simply state: "[T]hose
who drafted the Constitution thought1 42interpretative reference would
continue to be made to the natural law."
c.

Strong Role

143

Likely the strongest scholarly work on the interpretative impact of
the Declaration on constitutional interpretation from a Declarationist
perspective is, To Secure These Rights, written by Professor Scott
Gerber. 144 Gerber advocates a "liberal originalism" which, like its
counterpart "conservative originalism," acknowledges the importance of
However, unlike its
history to constitutional interpretation. 145
conservative antagonist, liberal originalism recognizes that the
Constitution was written "to establish a form of government that would
provide better security for natural rights."' 146 As a result, courts should
interpret the Constitution, especially its more abstract or general
provisions,14 7 "in light of natural-rights philosophy. 14 8
According to Gerber, the Declaration embodies the natural rights
philosophy of John Locke. 149 This philosophy, in turn, is embodied by
141.
142.

See id.
Id. at 109.

For another ambiguous reference to the Declaration's role see

CHARLES E. RICE, THE WINNING SIDE: QUESTIONS ON LIVING THE CULTURE OF LIFE 327

(1999) ("Although the Declaration is not enforceable as such in the courts, its principles
ought to inform our understanding of the purpose of the Constitution and the limits of
law.").
143. An interesting recurring motif of scholars who argue that the Declaration should
play an explicit role in constitutional interpretation is repeated appeals to President
Abraham Lincoln. This reliance on Lincoln occurs early in the genre, see George
Anastaplo, The Declaration of Independence, 9 ST. Louis U. L.J. 390, 395 (1964)
(describing Lincoln as the "most distinguished commentator on the Declaration of
Independence"); see also id. at 397 (discussing Lincoln's explanation of the meaning of
Declaration's use of "Equal"); id. at 406, and has continued to the present. For example,
Scott Gerber cites to and quotes Lincoln regularly. GERBER, supra note 1, at 50-51, 166,
208, 245. At one point, Gerber claims that securing natural rights was the purpose of the
Constitution, and then states: "That is the 'original intent' of the Founders." GERBER,
supra note 1, at 6. To support that proposition, Gerber cites Lincoln. GERBER, supra
note 1, at 6, 208.
144. See GERBER, supra note 1. For a work that simply asserts that "the Declaration
was the moral statement that would later become the foundation for the Constitution of
the new nation," and builds from that assertion, see NORMAN GEISLER & FRANK TUREK,
LEGISLATING MORALITY: IS IT WISE? IS IT LEGAL? IS IT POSSIBLE? 20 (1998).
145. See GERBER, supra note 1, at 6.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 10.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 40-56.
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the Constitution. 150
As a result, the Constitution is the means 15to
effectuate the end ordained by the Declaration: to secure natural rights.'
Gerber does not, however, delineate how a judge "appl[ies] the
fundamental moral and political principles on which this nation is based
to issues of present-day concern."' 152 Instead, he reviews different
provisions of the Constitution and suggests the correct interpretation of
the law in those areas "in light of' the Declaration. 153 For example,
Gerber argues that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the equal protection "component" of the Fifth
Amendment "are the Constitution's vehicles through which the
Declaration's concept of equality should be implemented."' 54 Referring
back to his "liberal" originalist methodology, Gerber summarily claims
that the Equal Protection Clause "was intended to embody the broad
155
principles of equality and natural rights articulated in the Declaration."'
Gerber makes similar, rather conclusory, arguments regarding the rights
of "life," "liberty," and the "pursuit of happiness.' ' 156 In the context of
the death penalty, for instance, Gerber recounts the argument against the
constitutionality of the death penalty, and then asserts that the "[n]aturalrights interpretation of the Constitution" affirms the constitutionality of
157
the death penalty.
One cannot discuss the Declarationist position without mentioning
158
_
Harry Jaffa, who has been the most outspoken-and caustic
proponent of that view. Jaffa has argued that "the principles of the
59
Declaration of Independence are the principles of the Constitution.',
Unfortunately, he never offers more than generalizations why that is the
case. Instead, Jaffa asserts that the Declaration "tells us why the political
authority of the Unites States is also a moral authority."' 160 The "very
150. Id. at 57-92.
151. GERBER, supra note 1, at 58; see also id. at 59 (stating that the "primary goal" of
the Constitution "is to provide the institutional means to secure the natural-rights
philosophical ends of the Declaration").
152.

Id. at 58-59.

153.
154.

Id. at 164-95.
Id. at 169.

155. GERBER, supra note 1, at 169; see also Howard Gilman, Scott Douglas Gerber,
To Secure These Rights, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 424, 425 (1998) (book review)

(questioning "Gerber's rapid-fire and cursory application of Locke").
156. GERBER, supra note 1, at 175-95.
157. Id. at 175-179.
158.

See, e.g., Harry V. Jaffa, What Were the "OriginalIntentions" of the Framers of

the Constitutionof the United States?, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 351, 355, 364, 372-73
(1987) (labeling originalists such as Bork and Chief Justice Rehnquist followers of John
C. Calhoun).
159. HARRY V. JAFFA ET AL., ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS OF THE
CONSTITUTION: A DISPUTED QUESTION 394 (1994).

160.

Id.
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soul of the American Constitution," according to Jaffa,61 and "our most
ennobling principles," are contained in the Declaration.'

Jaffa offers a handful of quotes from Jefferson, Madison, and above
all Lincoln, to support his contentions. In support of his argument, for
example, he relies on statements made by Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison in 1825 when they were creating a required reading list for the
University of Virginia.162 According to Jaffa, Lincoln was the first
president to understand the true meaning of the Declaration and to realize
that the American
system of government rested on the principles
63
1
therein.
espoused
2. Divergent Claims Regarding the Impact of the Declaration in
Constitutional Interpretation
In addition to coming to different conclusions regarding what role,
if any, the Declaration should play in constitutional interpretation,
Declarationist scholars themselves arrive at very different conclusions
about the practical impact of the Declaration playing that role. Not
surprisingly, the impact of the Declaration falls roughly into liberal and
conservative camps.164
Declarationist scholars of a liberal bent often argue that, properly
interpreted, the Constitution protects rights to abortion, suicide, welfare,
homosexual sex, and prohibits differentiation based on gender, class, and
sexual orientation, among other bases. 165 By contrast, Declarationist
scholars of a conservative bent tend to argue that the Constitution, as
properly interpreted in light of the Declaration, would prohibit abortion,
homosexual marriage, euthanasia, affirmative166action, and would permit
(or require) governmental recognition of God.
161. Id. at 56.
162. See id. at 22.
163. This claim may seem too strong when one considers that our third president was
the Declaration's author, Thomas Jefferson, but Jaffa never addresses this problem.
164. Declarationists such as Gerber are aware of the claim that their view "merely
mask[s] the biases of those who employ them." GERBER, supra note 1, at 177.
165. See id. at 164-94 (listing homosexual sex, suicide, and welfare as constitutionally
protected activities); Sandefur, supra note 3, at 520-40 (listing freedom from racial
discrimination, and freedom for abortion and homosexual sex, among others); see also
Debate Between Justice Scalia and ACLU President Nadine Strossen on Constitutional

Interpretation (Oct.
15,
2006), available at rtsp://video.c-span.org/1 5days/
e 101506_civilrights.rm?mode=compact (visited Oct. 17, 2006) (arguing that the ACLU's
method of constitutional interpretation best effectuates the Declaration's principles). For
an interesting twist to the impact of the Declaration in constitutional interpretation, see
MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 129-76 (1999)
(arguing that the Declaration and the Constitution, read together, require elimination of
judicial review).
166. See NORMAN GEISLER & FRANK TUREK, LEGISLATING MORALITY: IS IT WISE? Is
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The Declaration of Independence is One of Many Sources of
Original Meaning of the Constitution, and it Therefore Does Not

Play a Unique Role in Constitutional Interpretation
A.

Proper ConstitutionalInterpretativeMethodology: Originalism
I have elsewhere argued that the proper interpretative methodology

for our Constitution is originalism. 167 Originalists argue, based on
numerous, sometimes conflicting normative arguments, 168 that the
original meaning of the Constitution is its authoritative meaning. The
Constitution's original meaning is the publicly understood meaning of

the text of the Constitution at the time it was ratified. To ascertain the
original meaning of the Constitution one looks to its text, the use of
similar words elsewhere in the Constitution, the Constitution's structure,
and the text's historical context: contemporary discussions of the text,
official action taken pursuant to the text, and use of similar texts
elsewhere in society at the time. Determining the original meaning is,
therefore, largely an historical inquiry.
The historical evidence that our

society,

in

ratifying

the

Constitution, meant for its original meaning to be the binding and
authoritative meaning is strong, and I have elsewhere discussed more
fully the bindingness of the original meaning today.169 This conclusion
also has strong scholarly support.17 0 Given our society's commitment to
(listing abortion, euthanasia,
homosexual activity, slavery, polygamy and illegal drugs as activities that would be
prohibited or discouraged); Hollowell, supra note 101, at 72-74 (arguing that abortion is
IT LEGAL? IS IT POSSIBLE? 22-23, 115-16, 151-52 (1998)

unconstitutional); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240-41 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Declaration, through the Equal Protection
Clause, outlaws affirmative action).
167. See generally Lee J. Strang, The Clash of Rival and Incompatible Philosophical
Traditions Within ConstitutionalInterpretation: Originalism Grounded in the Central
Western Philosophical Tradition, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 909, 982-1001 (2005)
[hereinafter Strang Philosophical Traditions] (grounding originalism in the Aristotelian
tradition's concept of the common good).
168. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 113, at 109-13 (arguing that originalism is
justified because the value of "writtenness" it serves, which in turn provides adequate
assurance of the legitimacy of the governmental processes established by the
Constitution); see SCALIA, supra note 7, at 38-44 (arguing that originalism is the only
interpretative methodology that is consistent with our democratically adopted
Constitution); see WHITrINGTON, supra note 113, at 152-59 (finding that originalism is
the legitimate interpretative methodology because it is "a necessary component" of the
Constitution's commitment to popular sovereignty); see Strang Philosophical Traditions,
supra note 167, at 982-1001 (grounding originalism in the Aristotelian tradition's
concept of the common good).
169. See Strang Philosophical Traditions, supra note 167, at 970-81.
170.

See, e.g., JOHNATHAN O'NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A

CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 12-42 (2005) (arguing that originalism was the predominant
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originalism, the Declaration's role in constitutional interpretation is
limited to one of the sources of the constitutional text's original meaning.
Originalists further contend that judges are authorized to declare
acts of the elected branches unconstitutional, and hence void, only when
those acts conflict with the determinate original meaning of the
Constitution's text. 17 1 Consequently, under our constitutional social
ordering, judges may not, generally, directly appeal to natural law norms
when adjudicating constitutional cases unless the positive legal
materials-the text and original meaning of the Constitution-authorize
172
such an appeal.
Given this commitment to originalism, Declarationists cannot argue
that judges should utilize natural law norms found outside of the
Constitution's original meaning, such as those said to reside
independently in the rights phrase of the Declaration, to adjudicate
constitutional cases. Below I will show that the original understanding
of the Declaration's role was that it was one source of the Constitution's
original meaning and not an independent source of natural rights or
legally binding norms.
B.

OriginalMeaning of the Role of the Declarationin Constitutional
Interpretation: One Source Among Many
1.

Historical Evidence

a.
Original Understanding of the Role of the Declaration in
Constitutional Interpretation: The "Original" Constitution
In my research of the period of the Framing and Ratification of the
Constitution, I uncovered very few explicit statements regarding, and
few more implicit references to, the Declaration, and none arguing that
the Declaration would play a unique and explicit role in constitutional
interpretation. Moreover, I did not uncover any use of the Declaration in
constitutional interpretative methodology during and after Ratification until the early half
of the twentieth century); CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW:
FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW 17 (rev. ed. 1994)
(reviewing the history of the Framing and Ratification and concluding that originalist
"rules for interpreting a constitution were so generally agreed upon that they were more
or less noncontroversial or taken for granted").
171. Lee J. Strang, The Role of the Common Good in Legal and Constitutional
Interpretation, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 48, 69-74 (2005) [hereinafter Strang Common
Good].
172. See BARNETT, supra note 113, at 258 (stating that the Constitution's original
meaning requires judges to employ natural rights because of the Ninth Amendment and
the Privileges and Immunities Clauses).
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arguments for or against a particular interpretation of the Constitution.
Instead, the Framers and Ratifiers used or referred to the
Declaration very rarely. When they did use the Declaration, it was for
three main purposes: (1) its practical impact as the creator and point of
independence from Great Britain; 17 3 (2) to bolster an argument for or
against the Constitution (or a particular provision in the Constitution)
where the disputants agreed on the Constitution's meaning; 17 4 and (3) for
rhetorical impact. 175 Historians, such as Pauline Maier, have concluded
similarly: "Participants in the extensive debates over the creation and
ratification of the federal constitution mentioned the Declaration ...very
infrequently and then generally cited its assertion of the people's
right to
' 176
ones."
new
found
to
and
governments'
their
'abolish or alter
While the majority of references to the Declaration regarded its
creation of American independence, some of the references to the
Declaration during the Framing and Ratification used it to argue for or
against the proposed Constitution (or a particular provision in the
Constitution) by pointing to positive or negative characteristics of the
Constitution (or the provision). What is interesting is that the different
sides during ratification generally agreed 177 on the Constitution's
meaning without utilizing the Declaration to arrive at that meaning, and
then used the Declaration to argue for or against the Constitution based
on that agreed-upon meaning. Review of the historical record, therefore,
leads to the conclusion that the Declaration of Independence was one
source of the original meaning of the Constitution's text, and that it had
no unique role in constitutional interpretation.
During the Constitutional Convention, the delegates referred to the
Declaration of Independence infrequently,' and the Constitution they
created did not incorporate any of the Declaration's language., 78 The
Philadelphia delegates did not make any statements supporting the
Declarationist view. 179 Instead, delegates discussed the Declaration with
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Detweiler, supra note 15, at 558, 560-61, 564.
Id. at 562-64.
Id.at 559-60.
MAIER, supra note 11, at 169.
Or they at least did not note any conscious disagreement.
Detweiler, supra note 15, at 562.
See JAMES MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION

OF 1787:
INTRODUCTION, reprintedin 5 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
IN THE CONVENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787 WITH A DIARY OF THE DEBATES OF
THE CONGRESS OF THE CONFEDERATION AS REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON, 1 10 (Jonathan

Elliot ed., Burt Franklin Reprints 1968) (1974) [hereinafter 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES] (noting

that the initial reference to the Declaration is made by Madison in his introduction to his
notes from the Constitutional Convention. In these opening remarks, Madison provided a
timeline for events leading to the Federal Convention, including the Declaration and the
Articles of Confederation).
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reference to its practical impact. For instance, on June 19, 1787, Rufus
King and Luther Martin debated the Declaration's impact vis-a-vis
independence.' 80
King stated that the states were not complete
sovereigns because they could not make war, peace, alliances, or
treaties.181 Martin responded that the Declaration had instead "placed the
thirteen states in a state of nature towards each other."' 182 James Wilson
rose to King's defense, as did Alexander Hamilton, 83arguing that the
Declaration created an independent nation, not nations. 1
Later, during a debate on July 7 on the balance of power between
the states and the national government, Gouvemeur Morris referred to
the Declaration as the point of independence and the point at which the
first national American government was formed. 184
Morris then
recounted how the newly-independent smaller states had "extorted from
the large ones an equality of votes" bringing on
the possibility of national
185
Netherlands.
the
or
Germany
like
dissolution
The state ratification conventions likewise generally focused on the
Declaration's role in independence-if the subject of the Declaration
came up at all-and did not discuss any role for the Declaration in
constitutional interpretation. 186 "Speakers in the ratifying conventions,
although they frequently discussed the rights of the people in relation to
government, rarely invoked Jefferson's language of 1776 .187
In the Pennsylvania ratification convention, for instance, Wilson
stated that the Declaration created one national society. 188 Similarly,
Charles Pinckney in the South Carolina convention stated that "the
Declaration of Independence ... sufficiently refutes the doctrine of the

180. See generally JAMES MADISON, DEBATES INTHE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
HELD AT PHILADELPHIA, June 19, 1787, reprintedin 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES at 212-23.

181. Id. at 212 (remarks of Rufus King).
182. Id. at 213 (remarks of Luther Martin).
183. Id. at 213-14 (remarks of James Wilson and Alexander Hamilton). The only
other direct reference to the Declaration during the month of June came on the 28th by
Edmund Randolph, who "proposed... that a sermon be preached at the request of the
Convention on the Fourth of July, the anniversary of Independence ....
Id. at 254.
184. JAMES MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, HELD AT
PHILADELPHIA, (July 7, 1787), reprinted in 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 179, at 286-

87 (remarks of Gouverneur Morris).
185. Id. at 287.
186. Detweiler, supra note 15, at 563; see WILLS, supra note 11, at 324 (stating that
"[tihe Declaration played almost no part in the debates over ratification of the
Constitution").
187. Detweiler, supra note 15, at 563.
188. James Wilson, Address at the State Constitutional Ratification Convention for
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Dec. 4, 1787), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: PENNSYLVANIA,
[hereinafter 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].

472 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976)
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189
individual sovereignty and independence of the several states.,
At another point in the Pennsylvania convention, James Wilson
argued that the Declaration recognized "the inherent and unalienable
right of the people"' 90 to create any form of government they thought
conducive to "their safety and happiness."'1 9 Wilson was responding to
the claim that upon independence, sovereignty returned to the states
individually. 192 He did not use the Declaration to argue for or against a
particular interpretation of the Constitution.
Delegates to the state conventions also occasionally used the
Declaration, not as a means to interpret the Constitution, but to argue for
other contested propositions. The delegates would agree on the meaning
of a constitutional provision-without recourse to the Declaration-and
then argue that the provision was substantively flawed (or sound, as the
case may be) and use the Declaration to support that contention.
One example of this is the debate over the absence of a bill of
rights. On November 28, 1787, in the Pennsylvania Convention, John
Smilie, an opponent of ratification, objected to Wilson's argument that a
bill of rights was unnecessary. 193 Instead, Smilie found a bill of rights
indispensable because it established parameters for those in power, 194 and
to support his position he quoted the Declaration for the proposition that
America should secure its rights through a bill of rights or else the right
to abolish government is "mere sound without substance."' 95 Two days
later, Thomas Hartley defended Wilson's position by using the
Declaration to contend that a bill of rights was unnecessary because "[a]s
soon as the independence of America was declared in the year 1776,
from that instant all our natural rights were restored to US.', 19 6 Both sides

189. DEBATES IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 43 (Charleston, A.E. Miller 1831) (1788); see
also Larson, supra note 112, at 746-49 (giving examples of this use of the Declaration).
190. James Wilson, Address at the State Constitutional Ratification Convention for
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Dec. 4, 1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra

note 188, at 472.
191. Id.at473.
192. Id. at 472-73.
193. James Wilson, Address at the State Constitutional Ratification Convention for
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Dec. 4, 1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra

note 188, at 383-84. See John Smilie, Address at the State Constitutional Ratification
Convention for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Nov. 28, 1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 188, at 385-86 (rejecting Wilson's argument that a Bill of Rights is
unnecessary).
194. John Smilie, Address at the State Constitutional Ratification Convention for the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Nov. 28, 1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 188, at 385-86.
195. Id. at 385.
196. Thomas Hartley, Address at the State Constitutional Ratification Convention for
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Nov. 30, 1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 188, at 430.
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in the debate over inclusion of a bill of rights referred to the Declaration,
not as an interpretative key, but to argue for or against a bill of rights.
In the Virginia ratification convention, George Mason and James
Madison debated the Importation Clause. During the debate, Mason
used the Declaration to argue against the constitutional provision whose
meaning everyone agreed upon.Mason argued: "No sooner did the
revolution take place, than it [slavery] was thought of It was one of the
great causes of our separation from Great-Britain. Its exclusion has been
97
a principal object of this State, and most of the States in the Union.''
The Importation Clause would have been a logical place to use the
Declaration to interpret the Constitution. However, Mason recognized
that the Importation Clause had a meaning independent of, and in
conflict with the Declaration's.
In the broader public debate surrounding Ratification, references to
the Declaration also centered on its impact vis-a-vis independence and
not on its role in constitutional interpretation.
James Madison, in
Federalist 45, echoed the nationalist understanding of the Declaration's
impact finding that it created one, independent nation. 198 Similarly, in an
article appearing in the Trenton Mercury on November 6, 1787, entitled
A Jerseyman: To the Citizens of New Jersey, the Declaration is
referenced as the starting point of the nation's existence. 199
In an article in the Pennsylvania Gazette, Tench Coxe addressed
those who opposed ratification of the Constitution because they feared
"state sovereignties, would indeed be finally annihilated., 20 0 He began
197.

George Mason, Address at the State Constitutional Ratification Convention for

the Commonwealth of Virginia (June 17, 1788), in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE
STATES: VIRGINIA, 1338 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993). Madison
responded by claiming that protection of the slave trade was necessary to ensure the
southern states' joining the Union. Id. at 1338-39.
198. THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 40
(James Madison) (appealing to the Declaration when he argued that the Federal
Convention was justified in creating an entirely new constitution and not merely
amending the Articles).

199.

A Jerseyman: To the Citizens of New Jersey, TRENTON MERCURY, Nov. 6, 1787,

reprinted in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION:
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: DELAWARE, NEW JERSEY, GEORGIA,

CONNECTICUT, 146 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1978) [hereinafter 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY];

see also Letter from Edmund Randolph, The Honorable Speaker of the House of
Delegates, to Virginia Legislature (Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: VOLUME 3: 18 DECEMBER 1787 TO 31 JANUARY

1788, 128 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1984) [hereinafter 15
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY] (using the Declaration as a reference point to when Americans
were united).
200. Tench Coxe, A Freeman 1, PENNSYLVANIA GAZETTE, Jan. 23, 1788, reprintedin
15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 199, at 455.
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by recalling how American independence had placed the nation in a
vulnerable position, prompting the states to form a confederacy to
recreate the union dissolved by the Declaration. 20 According to Coxe,
and Great Britain
the Declaration dissolved the ties between the colonies
20 2
as well as the ties among the states themselves.
An unknown author in the Pennsylvania Packet drew on the
parallels between the signing of the Declaration and the drafting of the
Constitution to advocate its adoption.203 The author only noted the
Declaration in passing, as the point of independence. By contrast,
another commentary, PhiladelphiensisVIII, argued against ratification of
the Constitution because of the differences between the processes that led
to the Declaration and the Constitution.20 4 However, neither used the
Declaration for constitutional interpretation.
Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States 205 was the major work on the Constitution's history, nature, and
meaning in the early nineteenth century.20 6 In it, Story devoted a chapter
to how one properly interprets the Constitution.20 7 Story's interpretative
methodology was originalist. 20 8 Despite providing a fairly in-depth
analysis of how to interpret the Constitution, Story did not discuss or
refer to the Declaration. 20 9 Instead, Story stated that one must "construe
them [the Constitution's terns] according to the sense of the terms, and
201.
202.

Id.
Id. See also SIMEON

BALDWIN, AN ORATION PRONOUNCED BEFORE THE CITIZENS
4
TH 1788; IN COMMEMORATION OF THE DECLARATION OF
OF NEW HAVEN, JULY
INDEPENDENCE AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA (1788) [hereinafter Baldwin], reprinted in 18 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION PUBLIC

AND PRIVATE: VOLUME 6 10 MAY TO 13 SEPTEMBER 1788, 236 (John P. Kaminski &
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1995) [hereinafter 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY] ("The
declaration of independence, dissolved the political bands-it cut the nerves of former
compacts.").
203. Unknown title, PENNSYLVANIA PACKET, Jan. 14, 1788, reprinted in 15
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 199, at 370-71 ("It is agreeable ... to observe how
many of the same events and circumstances concur in favour of the New Federal
Government, that occurred in favour of the opposition to Great Britain and the
declaration of independence in the beginning of the war.").
204. Philadelphiensis VIII, PHILADELPHIA FREEMAN'S J., Jan. 23, 1788, reprintedin
15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 199, at 459-61.
205. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

(Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833).
206. For a discussion on Story's Commentaries, see generally H. Jefferson Powell,
Joseph Story 's Commentaries on the Constitution: A Belated Review, 94 YALE L.J. 1285
For a broader explanation of Story's legal views, see generally JAMES
(1985).
MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1971).

207.
208.
method
209.

STORY, supra note 205, at 134-62.
Id. at 135-36; see also O'NEILL, supra note 170, at 21-22 (describing Story's
of interpretation as originalist).
STORY, supra note 205, at 134-62.
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the intention of the parties, ' 210 which one gathers from: the conventional
meaning of the text, other uses of the terms in the Constitution, context,
the nature of the subject matter, the purpose(s) of the Constitution and
the particular term, and the consequences of an interpretation. 2 11 The
only references Story made to the Declaration occurred elsewhere in his
Commentaries and were regarding its historical and legal significance
effecting separation from Great Britain.212 Under Story's originalist
methodology, the Declaration was a source to which one refers in
ascertaining the Constitution's meaning, but it did not play a
qualitatively more prominent role than other sources.213
It is likely true, as Professor Gerber argues, that some Americans
during the Framing and Ratification saw the Constitution as the means to
protect the rights secured in the fight for independence.2 14 That is why
both proponents and opponents of the Constitution periodically used the
Declaration to argue that the Constitution did, or did not, fulfill the
Declaration's promise. In the article, A Georgian, the author objected to
the ratification of the Constitution because it was his "heart's wish to see
a federal constitution established agreeable to the principles of
republican liberty and independence, and on the basis of a democratical
government, meaning that of the people, being that very government

210. Id. at 135.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 88-89.
213. Story's interpretative methodology followed very closely that explained by
William Blackstone.
SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND *59-61 (U. Chicago Press 1979) (1769).
Blackstone's interpretative prescriptions were also followed by the first American

editor of his Commentaries, St. George Tucker. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES 60-62 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 1996) (1803). Like Story, Tucker
did not refer to the Declaration when he explained the federal judiciary's role of
interpreting the Constitution. Id. at 356-57 (Appendix). Instead, Tucker explained the
judiciary's duty to declare void legislative acts contrary to the Constitution and gave a
few examples, all tied to specific portions of the Constitution's text. Id. Also like Story,
Tucker's references to the Declaration are limited to its role in justifying and creating
independence from Great Britain. Id. at 13, 74-75, 173 (Appendix).

James Kent was the author of the treatise, first published in 1827, that was second
only to Story's in early nineteenth century American law. JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES
ON AMERICAN LAW (Rothman Publications 1999) (12th ed. 1873, O.W. Holmes, Jr., ed.).

Kent, like Story and Tucker, followed the Blackstonian interpretative prescriptions. Id. at
296, 460-65. And also like Story and Tucker, Kent described constitutional interpretation
without reference to the Declaration, id. at 450-55, and instead noted the Declaration in
passing when recounting the history of the United States. Id. at 209-10.
214. GERBER, supra note 1, at 3, 6, 15, 59; see also Himmelfarb, supra note 2, at 17778 (supporting Gerber's position). But see Cosgrove, supra note 12, at 134 ("There is,
however, very scant evidence from the time of the Framing and Ratification that anyone
was thinking of the Constitution as an extension of a political theory announced in the
Declaration.").
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intended by our glorious Declaration of Independence. '21 5 A Georgian
closed with an appeal to the audience to compare the Constitution to the
Declaration so that the reader might find the former inadequate to
preserve the intent of the latter.21 6 By contrast, the author of an article in
the Pennsylvania Heraldviewed the Constitution as preserving the rights
espoused by the Declaration:
[W]hen we look forward to the happiness, the power, and the dignity,
which the event of that great day [July 4 th] ought to communicate to
our posterity; it becomes us, in the pride of our honest triumphs, to
provide the means for perpetuating the blessings we enjoy, and to
expect with zeal and confidence, from the Federal Convention, a
system of government adequate to the security and preservation of
those rights, which were promulgated by the ever-memorable
Declaration of Independency.
For some Americans, the Declaration formed the beginning point of a
providential national narrative in which the Constitution played the role
of giving "life" to an "expiring nation."218
However, as I argue below,2 19 even if some Framers and Ratifiers
broadly understood the Constitution to secure the natural rights listed in
the rights phrase, 220 Gerber and other Declarationists have failed to show
how that goal altered the meaning of the Constitution from what it would
have been absent the goal. Gerber fails to point to any instances during
the Framing and Ratification where the public understood the
215. A Georgian, GAZETTE OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, Nov. 15, 1787, reprinted in 3
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 199, at 236.
216. See id. at 243 ("Thus, fellow citizens, have I pointed out what I thought
necessary to be amended in our Federal Constitution. I beg you to call to mind our
glorious Declaration of Independence, read it, and compare it with the Federal
Constitution; what a degree of apostacy will you not then discover. Therefore, guard
against all encroachments upon your liberties so dearly purchased with the costly expense
of blood and treasure.").
217. PENNSYLVANIA HERALD, July 14, 1787, in 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE, VOLUME 1, at 165 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981).
218. Simeon Baldwin, supra note 202, in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 202,

at 238; see also William Pierce, An Oration, Delivered at Christ Church, Savannah, on
the 4th July, 1788, in Commemoration of the Anniversary of American Independence, in
18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 202, at 249-54 (describing the process of decline
and rise that corresponds to the Articles and the Constitution).
219. See infra notes 239-274 and accompanying text (arguing that Gerber has failed
to show that the broad purpose of the Framers and Ratifiers-securing the common
good-requires one to interpret the Constitution differently than one otherwise would,
absent the Declaration).
220. See Jason F. Robinson, Book Note, Gerber's to Secure These Rights, 12 J.L. &
POL. 123, 136 (1995) (arguing that Gerber oversimplifies the history, particularly the
question of whether the Framers and Ratifiers saw the Constitution's primary purpose as
protecting natural rights).
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Constitution to mean something other than it would have meant absent
the Declaration. Instead, as I have shown above, the Framers and
Ratifiers rarely used the Declaration, and they did so only as one part of
the broader context within which they operated. 221 Gerber's argument,
therefore, fails to show that the Declaration should hold a privileged
place in constitutional interpretation.
Originalism was the dominant method of constitutional
interpretation at the time of the Framing and Ratification.22 2 The focus
of the originalist inquiry is the constitutional text and its context. The
fact that some Framers and Ratifiers believed the Constitution secured
natural rights is simply one part of the broader constitutional context.
There were many instances in which the Framers and Ratifiers debated
whether to include a provision in the proposed Constitution, or a
provision that was included in the proposed Constitution, where
discussion of the Declaration would naturally have lent itself. But this
simply did not happen. Instead, they focused their energies on the legal
text at issue and its context to ascertain what the provision meant and
why the provision was good or bad. For example, in the debate over the
scope of federal supremacy in Article VI, both proponents and opponents
of the Constitution made arguments from text, history, and political
theory.223 They did not make arguments grounded in the Declaration
even though such arguments would have naturally fit with the topic. For
example, elsewhere, Rufus King, Luther Martin, and James Wilson had
debated the effect of the Declaration on state sovereignty,22 4 but no
similar argument was raised during the discussion of the Supremacy
Clause.
Scholars who advocate for a role for the Declaration in
constitutional interpretation focus almost exclusively on the first two
sentences in the second paragraph, and more specifically, on the
reference to the rights of "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness,"
what I have been calling the rights phrase.225 The vast bulk of the
Declaration is not, however, a natural law document. Instead, the body
of the Declaration is a list of violations by the King-not of natural law

221.
222.
223.

See supra Part III.B. l.a.
See supra Part III.A.
See NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY

JAMES MADISON at 120-21, 139, 142, 306, 348-53, 381, 390, 517, 532, 626 (Ohio Univ.
Press 1966) [hereinafter NOTES OF DEBATES]; AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 34, 121, 178-79, 190, 299-307 (2005).
224. See NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 223,at 152-53.
225. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see Larson, supra note

112, at 711 ("[Declarationist] scholars focus almost exclusively on the second sentence of
the Declaration.").
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norms-but of the conventional rights of Englishmen. 226 As Professor
John Reid has noted, the Declaration "did not, in a single instance,
accuse George III of violating a natural right., 227
Instead, the
Declaration was a "bill of indictment against the king, written in the
language of British constitutionalism. ' , 228 Consequently, scholars who
concentrate on the rights language misplace their focus and distort the
meaning of the Declaration.
The Declaration's second paragraph was not the thrust of the
Declaration. The Declaration's goal was to establish that King George
had repeatedly "injur[ed] and usurp[ed]" the conventional rights of the
colonists as Englishmen. 229 The Declaration's second paragraph was not
a comprehensive, well-thought, binding pronouncement of the natural
law philosophy of a new nation.2 3 ° Moreover, none of the Declaration's
drafters or signers viewed it as such. Instead, the Declaration was a
defense of "ancient liberties and the British constitution from the malefic
scheming or corrupt imperial authorities.,

23

'

As Pauline Maier has

found, "the [Declaration's] original function was to end the previous
232
regime, not to lay down principles to guide and limit its successor.'
Therefore, to use the Declaration's second paragraph as a binding
statement of natural law norms is not faithful to the Declaration.2 33
Historian Philip Detweiler has persuasively argued that the
Declaration's rights phrase played little role in public debate and
discussion after independence, and only slowly came to occupy a more
important position. 234 "[T]he Fathers, although they did not ignore the
226.
227.

See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 3-29 (U.S. 1776).
JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 14

(abr. ed. 1995).
228.

DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 84 (1953).
See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 3-29 (U.S. 1776).
230. See WILLS, supra note 11, at 325 (finding that the "men who debated and passed
the Declaration ... were not trying to enunciate a new theory of government, to found a
nation, or to write a national charter").
231. KRAMER, supra note 124, at 37.
232. MAIER, supra note 11, at 192.
233. Scholars are divided on why the rights phrase was placed in the Declaration.
Some take the view that the rights phrase was intended as a propaganda piece for French
consumption.
See RUSSELL KIRK, RIGHTS AND DUTIES: REFLECTIONS ON OUR
CONSERVATIVE CONSTITUTION 56-57 (1997) (the "phrases of the Declaration ... were
calculated to wake strong sympathy in France's climate of opinion"). Others, including
possibly Jefferson himself, saw the rights phrase simply as a reiteration of what nearly all
Americans believed. THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 343 (Paul Leicester Ford et
al., eds., 1899) (writing that the Declaration was "an expression of the American mind,
and to give that expression the proper tone and spirit called for by the occasion"). Still
others argue that the Declaration's preface was "designed first and foremost for domestic
consumption." MAIER, supra note 11, at 131.

229.

234.
decade

See Detweiler, supra note 15; see also MAIER, supra note !1, at xviii ("In the
or so after

1815

. .

. the document began to assume..

.

quasi-religious
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phrases of the preamble, viewed the Declaration principally as a
proclamation of independence."2 35 As Carlton Larson has noted, it was
the "specific charges laid against George III" that, "for the Continental
Congress[,] were the most important part of the Declaration. 236
Initially, Americans focused on the Declaration's impact of
independence. 237 Between the 1790s and 1820s, Americans' focus
changed to include the Declaration's rights phrase. 238 As a result, the
Declarationists' exclusive focus on the rights phrase is anachronistic.
Professor Gerber has put forth likely the strongest historical
argument that the original meaning of the Constitution (or at least some
of its provisions) incorporated the Declaration.23 9 He adduces numerous
quotes and statements that discuss natural rights generally, and the role
of government to protect those rights slightly more specifically, from the
Founding and Ratification (and thereafter). 240 However, Gerber's
argument fails for at least three reasons. First, Gerber fails to tie the
general belief in natural rights during the Founding and Ratification
period 24 1 to the Constitution except in the most general way. Second,
Gerber's evidence regarding the general belief in natural rights is better
explained, in the historical context, as the lingua franca of the period
when referring to the purpose of society: securing the common good.
And third, Gerber's Declarationist views are anachronistic.
First, Gerber fails to support his claim that the Framers and Ratifiers
understood the Constitution to incorporate the Declaration's principles.
The lack of direct evidence that the Framers and Ratifiers understood the
Constitution to incorporate the Declaration's principles is in part, Gerber
asserts, "because the matter was so well settled by the Declaration" (a
claim supported by Gerber with reference to the Preamble, which I
criticize below).242 While many issues were well settled and hence
uncontroversial for the Framers and Ratifiers, those issues had the

attributes.").
235. Detweiler, supra note 15, at 557-58.
236.

Larson, supra note 112, at 763.

237.
238.

See Detweiler, supra note 15, at 558-61.
See id. at 565-67.

239.

See GERBER, supra note 1, at 57-92.

240. See id. Randy Barnett, a scholar who shares views on the strong role of natural
rights and on originalism similar to Gerber's, does not find that the Declaration plays a
unique role in constitutional interpretation. See BARNETT, supra note 113 (making no
reference to the Declaration); Randy E. Barnett, James Madison's Ninth Amendment, in
THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH

AMENDMENT (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989) (same).
241.

See Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American

Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907 (1993) (surveying beliefs in natural rights during the
Founding era).
242.

GERBER, supra note 1, at 63.
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character of being part of deeply embedded norms and practices. For
example, I have argued elsewhere that one aspect of "judicial Power" in
243
Article III, which was deeply embedded in this way, was stare decisis.
To support my claim I provided evidence from English and American,
4
past and contemporary, practice and writing. 244
In this way, I was able to
claim legitimately that "stare decisis was part of the background of the
[Framers' and Ratifiers'] lawyerly understanding ofjudicial power. 245
By contrast, Gerber offers no evidence of a practice, past or
contemporary, of using the Declaration to interpret the Constitution, or
writers advocating the same. Gerber has therefore failed to substantiate
his claim that "the matter was ...well settled., 246 Others have criticized
Gerber as well, finding that the "social, political, and economic
circumstances surrounding the drafting of the Constitution become
secondary for Gerber, leaving him free to sift the sources for phrases and
paragraphs that support his thesis. 24 7
Two statements by one person, James Wilson, are Gerber's most
explicit sources 248 in tying the Declaration to the Constitution in any
way.249 However, these quotes do not support Gerber's argument.
Instead, in the first quote, Wilson did not even refer to the Declaration
but instead stated that "peace, freedom, and happiness" are the end of
good government. 25 0 This may have been a reference to the Declaration,
but it could just as easily have been a reference to some other document
243. Strang Originalist, supra note 114, at 466.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See GERBER, supra note 1,at 63.
247. Wendy Ann Semel, Defender of the Natural Rights Faith,105 YALE L.J. 1427,
1431 (1996) (reviewing SCOTT D. GERBER, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION

(1995)).
248. Gerber himself recognizes the unique nature of these quotes for his purposes.
Gerber writes: "Wilson specifically refers to the Constitution as a 'means' to secure the
philosophical 'ends' of the Declaration") in one instance, and that he "went so far as to
quote the Declaration," in the other. GERBER, supra note 1,at 83 (emphases added).
249. Here is Gerber's discussion of the two Wilson quotes:
[1] In one of his Pennsylvania ratifying-convention speeches, for example,
Wilson specifically refers to the Constitution as the "means" to secure the
philosophical "ends" of the Declaration of Independence. [2] In another
ratifying-convention speech... Wilson went so far as to quote the Declaration
of Independence at length and then state, "This the broad basis on which our
independence was placed; [and] on the same certain and solid foundation this
system [the Constitution] is erected."
OF INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

GERBER, supra note 1,at 83 (citing James Wilson, Speech to the Pennsylvania Ratifying
Convention, Nov. 26, 1787, in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 769-70 (McCloskey, ed.,
1967) [hereinafter 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON], and Speech by James Wilson in the
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Dec. 4, 1787, in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY supra
note 188, at 473).

250.

James Wilson, Speech to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Nov. 26, 1787,

in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 249, 769.
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(the Virginia Declaration of Rights) or a theorist's writings (Locke), and
Gerber gives no support for his interpretation.25 1
Even assuming Wilson did refer to the Declaration, he was simply
making the innocuous claim that the Declaration identified the goals of
government while the Constitution created the means to effectuate those
ends. Wilson was not advancing Gerber's narrower proposition that the
meaning of the Constitution is to be derived (in whole or part) from the
Declaration. There is no logical reason-and Gerber points to no
historical reason-why the Constitution's connection with the ultimate
ends of government requires one to interpret the Constitution differently
because of the Declaration (at least when the Constitution's meaning is
determinate). In fact, the historical evidence shows, as Professor Jack
Rakove has argued, that Americans at the time of the Framing and
Ratification understood the "distinction... between fundamental
principles of government ...and the actual forms that any individual
government could take. 252
One way to show the lack of a necessary connection between the
goals of the Framers and Ratifiers and the meaning of the Constitution is
to assume that the Declaration's rights phrase is incorrect and to note the
impact on the meaning of the Declaration. Assume that, for example,
government need not rest on consent. The incorrectness of the rights
phrase would not alter the legal effect of the Declaration because the
legal command of independence is not related to or dependent upon the
precatory language in the rights phase.253 Similarly, even if securing the
rights proclaimed by the Declaration was the goal of the Constitution,
that goal has no necessary bearing on the meaning of the Constitution's
text.

254

251.

For a statement similar to Wilson's, made in the Virginia ratification convention,

see 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL

CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787 586 (2d ed. 1968) (George Wythe) ("To

perpetuate the blessings of freedom, happiness, and independence, he demonstrated the
necessity of a firm, indissoluble union of the states."). Like Wilson's statement, Wythe's
does not quote the Declaration.
252. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 19 (1996).

253. See O'NEIL, supra note 5, at 239 (giving a similar example).
254. A more concrete example of this lack of connection is the Constitution's
Preamble. It contains language similar to the rights phrase-language which the
Supreme Court has ruled does not provide enforceable legal norms. Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905) ("Although the Preamble indicates the general
purposes for which the people ordained and established the Constitution, it has never
Such powers embrace only
been regarded as the source of any substantive power ....
those expressly granted in the body of the Constitution .... Although, therefore, one of
the declared objects of the Constitution was to secure the blessings of liberty to all under
the sovereign jurisdiction and authority of the United States, no power can be exerted to
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An example of the lack of necessary connection between the
meaning of a legal text and the purposes or goals of the text's creator(s)
can be found in hypothesizing an agricultural subsidy bill.255 Assume

that the bill's sponsor, a senator from an agricultural state, publicly
declares that the purpose of the bill is to decrease farm commodity
prices.
The senator convinces the public and, more importantly,
Congress and the President, and his bill becomes law. It is easy to
imagine, at this point, that the senator could desire one goal but create a
different effect. He may simply have been mistaken in his understanding
of the effect of the law. Perhaps he was ignorant of basic economic
principles. Whatever the cause, if the statutory scheme mandates that
farmers produce fewer units of a particular product, without reducing
demand, the effect of the law will be to increase commodity prices. A
court could not override the statutory scheme simply because the
statute's impact would be in opposition to the goal of the law's
creator(s). This hypothetical illustrates that "[b]oth expectations and
motivations [for a text] exist256independently of the text and bear only a
contingent relationship to it."
This type of situation-where the meaning of a law and the goal of

the law's creators conflict-is a relatively common occurrence.

This

occurrence leads to the tension judges sometimes face between their duty
to uphold the law and the resultant injustice that will occur.25 7 And this
also leads to the concept of equity, where a court will mold, massage or,
in some cases, completely disregard the legal text's conventional
meaning to reach the equitable result, the result the legislator would have
wanted the judge to reach. 258 These aspects of our legal practice,

that end by the United States unless, apart from the Preamble, it be found in some express
delegation of power.

...). Instead, the Constitution's body is the only source of such

norms. Id.
255. See O'NEIL, supra note 5, at 239 (giving a similar example).
256. Keith E. Whittington, Dworkin's "Originalism": The Role of Intention in
ConstitutionalInterpretation,62 REV. POL. 197, 211 (2000).
257. This tension that judges feel between doing justice in the case before them and
their legal duty is the result of the division in our society between law making and law
applying functions. See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1-I, at q. 95, a. 1.
(Benzinger Bros. 1947) [hereinafter SUMMA THEOLOGICA] (emphases deleted) ("As the
Philosopher says (Rhet. i. 1), it is better that all things be regulated by law, than left to be
decided by judges.").
258. See generally Church of the Holy Trinity v. U.S, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) (utilizing
an equitable interpretation of a federal criminal statute to reach what in the Court's view
was Congress' purpose); see alsoARJSTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN Ethics 1 137b (D.P. Chase
trans. 1947) ("When then the law has spoken in general terms, and there arises a case of
exception to the general rule, it is proper, in so far as the lawgiver omits the case and by
reason of his universality of statement is wrong, to set right the omission by ruling it as
the lawgiver himself would rule were he there present, and would have provided by law
had he foreseen the case would arise."); see Strang, Common Good, supra note 171, at
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therefore, bear witness to the fact that there is no necessary connection
between a legislator's goal and the conventional meaning of a legal text.
Elsewhere, I have explained how the ultimate ends of the
Constitution have a role to play in constitutional interpretation, but only
when the Constitution's original meaning is underdetermined.2 59 Gerber,
by contrast, appears to envision a role for the ultimate ends of
government even when the Constitution's original meaning is
determinate. 260 Keith Whittington has argued that natural law theories of
interpretation, where the natural law norms override the determinate
constitutional text, "cannot fit with the experience of possessing a written
constitution at all. '261 In such theories, like Gerber's, the constitutional
text is not doing any work. "To point to the natural law foundations held
by those who drafted the Constitution, and then seek to access them
directly, is to miss the point of the drafting, which was to provide
political reminders of and legal force for those moral requirements."262
Gerber fails to show how, specifically, the Declaration's principles were
incorporated into the Constitution. He simply asserts that constitutional
provisions mean what the Declaration means.263
The Declaration's role regarding the meaning of any particular
provision of the Constitution is an historical question that one cannot
answer a priori, as Gerber does. 264 So the meaning of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause, for instance, depends on its text, the
broader structure of the Constitution, and context surrounding adoption
of the Clause. The overarching goal of the Framers and Ratifiers may
play a role at the margins, for example, when the original meaning is
underdetermined, but in those areas where the original meaning is
determinate, the ends of government and/or the Declaration's principles
have little if any role to play in ascertaining that meaning.265
Thus, since the original meaning of the Cruel and Unusual

59-66 (explaining the concept of equity further).
259. See Strang Common Good, supra note 171, at 70-74.
260. In the last chapter of To Secure These Rights, Gerber appears to simply substitute
what he understands the Declaration to mean for the constitutional text's original
meaning. See GERBER, supra note 1, at 162-95.

261.

WHITTINGTON,

262.

Id. "Axioms alone," Jack Rakove has noted, "do not solve problems." RAKOVE,

supra note 113, at 31.

supra note 252, at 19.
263. See GERBER, supra note 1, at 162-95; see also Howard Gillman, Scott Douglas
Gerber, To Secure These Rights, 16 Law & Hist. Rev. 424, 424-25 (1998) (book review)
(arguing that "Gerber improperly interprets discussions about the judiciary's obligation to
protect vested rights-that is, rights vested in positive law, such as contract and property
rights-as justification for invoking natural rights.").
264. See GERBER, supra note 1, at 176-78.
265. See Strang Common Good, supra note 171, at 70-74 (explaining this).
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266
Punishment Clause determinately does not proscribe the death penalty,
the ends of government and/or the Declaration play no role in the
analysis to come to that conclusion. But, it may not be clear whether the
Clause prohibits, for example, chemical castration. 267 Regarding this
issue, assuming the Clause is underdetermined, the ends of government
may have a role to play to determine whether such a punishment violates
the Clause.
Gerber makes an argument strikingly similar to one made by Ronald
Dworkin when he claims that "many of the most significant provisions of
the Constitution are phrased in general terms" that "can be given
meaning and life only when they are construed in light of the moral and
political principles upon which they are based. 2 68 But Gerber, being an
originalist, simply begs the question:
what was the original
understanding of the clause in question? Was it "general," and did it
require interpretation "in light of ... moral and political principles, 2 69 or
was it more specific? As Whittington has argued, "the founders could
well have used 'broad' terms to convey relatively narrow thoughts. 27 °
Gerber simply asserts that the clauses are "general" and does not provide
any of the necessary historical evidence to support his claim. Without
historical support for this claim, Gerber's subsidiary account of the role
of the Declaration's philosophy also fails.
Regarding the second quote from James Wilson, Gerber states that
"Wilson went so far as to quote the Declaration of Independence at
length and then state, 'This is the broad basis on which our independence
was placed; [and] on the same certain and solid foundation this system
[the Constitution] is erected.' ' 271 In context, however, Wilson was
arguing that the people have the right "to form either a general
government, or state governments, in what manner they please" because
popular sovereignty is the "broad basis on which our independence was
,272
placed."
He was responding to claims that the Constitution would

266.

LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 240

(1999) ("Death itself

was an acceptable punishment.").
267. For a sampling of the controversy see, e.g., Bryan Keene, Chemical Castration:
An Analysis of California's "Cutting-Edge" Policy Towards Sex Offenders, 49 FLA. L.
REv. 803, 811 (1997); L. Spalding, Florida'sChemical Castration Law: A Return to the
Dark Ages, 25 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 117, 139 (1998).
268. GERBER, supra note 1, at 7. Compare DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note
113, at 7 ("Many of these clauses are drafted in exceedingly abstract moral language" so
that they "refer to abstract moral principles and incorporate them by reference.").
269. GERBER, supra note 1, at 7.
270. WHITTINGTON, supra note 113, at 184.
271. GERBER, supra note 1, at 83 (quoting Wilson Ratification Address, supra note
165, at 472-73).
272. James Wilson, Address at the State Constitutional Ratification Convention for
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Dec. 4, 1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
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destroy state sovereignty and to "illustrate[e]" his popular sovereignty
273
argument he "beg[ged] to read a few words from the Declaration.
Wilson was not endorsing the Declarationist position. Instead, as I have
argued,274 Wilson was simply using the Declaration in the ratification
debates to argue for ratification of the Constitution, not what the
Constitution meant.
Second, much of the evidence Gerber points to as showing that the
Framers and Ratifiers saw the purpose of government as securing natural
rights supports an argument I have made elsewhere: that the Constitution
was meant to secure the common good.275 For example, Gerber's first
piece of evidence that the purpose of the Constitution was to preserve
natural rights is the Preamble.276 Gerber admits that "the protection of
the people's natural rights" is "not explicitly stated," but then goes on to
277
Gerber
argue that "it was certainly well understood," in any event.
argues that every phrase in the Preamble-if properly understood, of
course-supports his argument that the purpose of the Constitution was
to secure natural rights.278
Even the phrase "promote the general welfare" is stretched by
Gerber to mean "secure the people's natural rights. 279 Indeed, Gerber
concedes that "[t]he 'general welfare' is properly understood as the
'public good' or 'public happiness' of society... rather than simply as
the protection of natural rights.5 280 Despite this concession, Gerber goes
on to assert that, while the Framers "sometimes" distinguished natural
rights from the common good, the "principaL" though "not the sole"
purpose of government was to secure natural rights. 281 Gerber's only
support for this assertion is the non-historical claim that the protection of
note 1880, at 472-73.
273. Id. at 472.
274. See supra notes 191-192 and accompanying text.
275. See Strang Philosophical Traditions, supra note 167, at 959-82; see also JOHN
FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 210-18 (1980) (explaining the relationship

between the common good and rights).
276. GERBER, supra note 1, at 60.
277. Id. (citing a statement by Edmund Randolph). Even Gerber's quote from
Randolph, however, supports the broader claim that natural rights "talk" was the
contemporary means of discussing the common good. Randolph, in the quote, argued
that a discussion regarding natural rights in the Preamble was improper because the
subject matter of the Constitution was a society, not a state of nature. See GERBER, supra
note 1, at 60.
278. The lengths to which Gerber goes to squeeze the historical evidence from the
period into his natural rights framework reminds one of Gerber's own admonition to
avoid using a natural law approach simply to "mask" one's own views. See GERBER,
supra note 1,at 163.
279. Id. at 62.
280. Id.
281. Id. (emphases added).
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individual rights depends on the preservation of political society. 282 In
other words, Gerber claims that the phrase "general welfare" in the
Preamble does not mean public good because of his prior philosophical
assumption about the relationship between natural rights and the general
welfare. Others have likewise noted Gerber's tendency to shoehorn all
of the historical evidence into
his preconceived "individual[] 'natural
283
rights' Lockean philosophy.,
Gerber also quotes James Madison in Federalist43 to support the
connection between natural rights and the public good.284 But Madison
is better understood as affirming the importance of the common good:
"the great principle of self-preservation [and] . . . the transcendent law of
nature and of nature's God... declares that the safety and happiness of
society are the objects to which all political institutions aim., 285 The
purpose of government, according to Madison, was the happiness of
society's members. 286 Therefore, Gerber has it backwards: Madison
argued that government should protect natural rights to ensure effective
pursuit of the common good and not, as Gerber asserts, effectively
pursue the common good to protect natural rights.
The better explanation for much of the evidence Gerber cites is that
the Framers and Ratifiers saw the purpose of government as securing the
common good. For example, the Preamble lists a number of components
of the common good-unity, justice, domestic peace, international
security, and liberty-and refers as well to the summary phrase "general
welfare. 2 87 As Jack Rakove has explained: "On the principles of
government, a broad consensus reigned. Government existed for the
good of the many,
and to protect the liberty, property, and equal rights of
288
the citizen.,
Lastly, Gerber's Declarationist views are anachronistic. This is
because, as explained above,289 for at least "the first fifteen years
following its adoption,... the Declaration of Independence seems to
have been all but forgotten, particularly within the United States, except
as the means by which Americans announced their separation from Great
282.
283.

Id.
See Stephen B. Presser,

To Secure These Rights: The Declaration of

Independence and ConstitutionalInterpretation, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 229, 235 (1997)

(book review); see also Cosgrove, supra note 12, at 132 (criticizing Gerber for his
historical "oversimplification").
284.

GERBER, supra note 1, at 62.

285. THE FEDERALIST No.43 (James Madison) (emphasis added).
286. See id.
287. See U.S. CONST., pmbl. This understanding of the Preamble is supported by
other facts I have discussed elsewhere; see Strang Philosophical Traditions, supra note
167, at 959-70.
288.

RAKOVE, supra note 252, at 19.

289.

See Part II.B.1.
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Britain." 290 Given the neglect into which the Declaration fell during the
period of Framing and Ratification, it is unlikely that the Framers and
Ratifiers meant for the Declaration to play a powerful role in
constitutional interpretation. And the evidence I reviewed above shows
that they did not.291
b.
Note on the Original Understanding of the Role of the
The "Reconstructed"
Declaration in Constitutional Interpretation:
Constitution
Most Declarationists, like Gerber, concentrate their historical
inquiries on the Framing and Ratification of the Constitution, and do not
discuss the Reconstruction era. 292 My preliminary research into this area
has led me to tentatively conclude that, although the evidence from the
period is relatively unclear, 293 it appears that the original understanding
of the relationship between the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Declaration was that the Declaration was one source of the Amendment's
original meaning and that the Declaration did not play a unique role in its
meaning. 294 However, given the space constraints of this Article and the
voluminous nature of the evidence from the period, which is itself hotly
contested by scholars,29 5 I will reserve for another time definitive
comment on the relationship between the Declaration and the Fourteenth
Amendment.
c.
Subsequent Appeals to the Declaration Brought About by
Moral Crises
I explained above how, initially, the Declaration was "all but
forgotten,, 296 and how Americans later repeatedly turned to it in times of
grave moral crisis, arguing that it has great significance for constitutional

290. MAIER, supra note 11, at 168-69; see also Cosgrove, supra note 12, at 135
(coming to this conclusion).
291. See supra Part II.B.1.
292. See generally, e.g., JAMES E. BOND, No EASY WALK TO FREEDOM:
RECONSTRUCTION AND THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1997);
HOWARD JAY GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION: HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE
FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT,
THE
"CONSPIRACY
THEORY,"
AND
AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONALISM (1968).

293. That is, relative to the Framing and Ratification of the original Constitution.
294. See AMAR, supra note 223, at 389-90 (arguing that the Declaration was or may
have been one source of the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges
and Immunities Clause).
295. Debate over the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, and especially Section
1, is long-standing and the participants have come to wildly divergent conclusions. See
GRAHAM, supra note 292, at 159-60.
296.

MAIER, supra note 11, at 168.

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 111:2

interpretation.297 These turns toward the Declaration are understandable.
When individuals or societies are faced with a grave moral dilemma,
they ask themselves who they are.298 In light of the answer to that
question, the individual or society can resolve the dilemma.299
For instance, persons with a drinking problem may become
conscious of their problem and the crisis it has created in their lives.
They must then decide if they want to continue as before or cease
drinking. °°
If they wish to cease drinking and join Alcoholics
Anonymous they will, through a personal "inventory" as part of the
twelve-step process, seek to "restore" themselves through the "remov[al]
of defects.",30 1 Stated differently, they will seek to return to who they are,
and from that position, face and hopefully overcome the crisis brought on
by alcoholism.
Our society is facing a number of moral crises. On issues such as
abortion, the nature of marriage, and euthanasia, our society is deeply
divided. Legal scholars and others responding to these dilemmas, like
Americans in the past, have turned to the Declaration for answers. The
resurgence in Declarationist arguments is likely partially attributable to
this phenomenon. As a result, we should be wary of anachronistically
attributing to the Framers and Ratifiers the Declarationist view that the
Declaration has a unique role in constitutional interpretation because
such attribution may say more about us today than it does about the
Framers and Ratifiers. This is especially true given the strong historical
evidence regarding the relative neglect into which the Declaration fell
after the Revolution.
2.

The Constitution Is Inconsistent with the Declaration

Beyond the contextual historical evidence that the Framers and
Ratifiers did not understand the Declaration to play a unique role in
constitutional interpretation are the dramatic inconsistencies between the
various provisions of the Declaration and the Constitution. These
contradictions make it difficult to construct, much less attribute to the
Framers and Ratifiers, a theory of constitutional interpretation that gives

297.
298.

See supra Part ll.B.
See Wilfred M. McClay, The Founding of Nations, 161 FIRST THINGS 33, 33-39

(2006) ("As before in our history, our current challenges have forced us to think more
deeply and clearly about who and what we are.").
299. Id.
300. When the founders of Alcoholics Anonymous met in 1935 one responded to the
other's "convincing ideas" and "soon got sober, never to drink again." ALCOHOLICS
ANONYMOUS,

A.A.

FACT

FILE

18

(1956),

anonymous.org/en-pdfs/m-24-aafactfile.pdf.
301. Id. at 13.

available at http://www.alcoholics-
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the Declaration pride-of-place. The most glaring instance of this
inconsistency is regarding the status of slaves.
The Declaration has the inspiring phrase "all men are created
equal. 3 °2
The original Constitution, by contrast, accommodated
slavery.30 3 In Article I, § 2, the Constitution provided that slave states
would benefit in their congressional representation by counting, for
population purposes, "three fifths of all other Persons. 30 4
The
Constitution further accommodated slavery by helping slave masters
recover escaped slaves through the Fugitive Slave Clause.30 5 Moreover,
the Constitution prohibited Congress, until at least 1808, from
eliminating the supply of new slaves by ending the slave trade. 30 6 The
Constitution's accommodation of slavery and the denial of equality it
entailed make it very difficult, if not impossible, to non-arbitrarily
interpret the Constitution through the lens of the Declaration.30 7
Even were one to assume that one could non-arbitrarily interpret the
Constitution in light of the Declaration, one would still have to explain
how the practice of slavery with its gross denial of equality existedindeed, flourished-under the Constitution until it was ended through the
Civil War. Gerber recognizes that slavery "is in direct contradiction with
the Declaration's concept of equality" and that "slavery continued as an
uneasy compromise" under the Constitution until the Thirteenth
Amendment. 30 8
However, he fails to explain why that "direct
contradiction" does not fundamentally undermine his argument that the
Declaration should play a unique role in constitutional interpretation.
The best synthesis Gerber puts forth is that the United States "was not
yet ready" to live up to the promise of the Declaration, and that the
30 9
Declaration "provide[d] the framework for slavery's eventual demise.'
Gerber argues that, in the case of slavery (among others), the Framers

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
303. Despite the Constitution's accommodation of slavery, the Constitution was not a
pro-slavery document in the sense of a document creating a form of government one of
whose purposes was to protect slavery. Arguably, the Constitution granted Congress the
power to restrict and maybe even eliminate slavery legislatively through, for example, the
Commerce Clause or Congress' power to tax. Congress' ability to restrict or eliminate
slavery legislatively was recognized by southerners who, when it became clear that the
North would gain a commanding majority in Congress, became more aggressive in their
actions to protect slavery, up to and including war.
304. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 2.
305. Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII § 1.
306. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
307. See O'NEItL, supra note 5, at 243 (arguing that provisions of the Constitution
inconsistent with the Declaration, if anything, repealed the Declaration to the extent of
the inconsistency).
308. GERBER, supra note 1, at 164-65.
309. Id. at 166.
302.
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and Ratifiers
"ignored the dictates of natural law for practical
3
reasons." 10

Gerber can only make this claim if the Constitution, properly
interpreted, contradicts the Declaration.
In other words, the
contradictions between the Constitution and Declaration identified by
Gerber show that one can, and must, properly interpret the Constitution
without reference to the Declaration. First, Gerber determined that the
Declaration's concept of equality was inconsistent with slavery. Second,
Gerber determined that the meaning of the Constitution permitted
slavery. These were two separate and independent determinations,
which showed that even Gerber recognizes that the Constitution has a
meaning independent of the Declaration. Otherwise, he would be unable
to argue that the Constitution conflicted with the Declaration.
Only relatively few, relatively radical abolitionists argued that the
Constitution, without necessity of amendment, outlawed slavery. Most
who opposed slavery argued instead for a federal law or constitutional
amendment to end slavery, recognizing that the law as it stood did not
eliminate slavery. The vast majority of Americans, and nearly all
lawyers and judges, never questioned the orthodoxy that the Constitution
permitted and accommodated slavery. As Robert Cover argued, despite
the recognition by many Americans that slavery conflicted with natural
law, there was "no constitutional confusion with respect to slavery"
because "the courts uniformly recognized a hierarchy of sources of law
for application in which 'natural law'
was subordinate to constitutions,
3 11
statutes, and well-settled precedent.
In fact, the major antebellum case to address the issue, Dred Scott v.
Sanford, declared the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, thereby
expanding slavery. 31 2 Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott relied
on the Constitution's accommodation of slavery in the Fugitive Slave
and Importation Clauses.313 Taney argued that slaves of African descent,
and descendants of such slaves, were not citizens of the United States as
that term was understood in the Constitution, because the Fugitive Slave
as a
and Importation Clauses "show clearly that they were not regarded
3 14
formed.,
then
Govemment
the
of
citizens
or
people
the
of
portion
310.

Id. at 164.

311.

ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

34 (Yale University Press 1984) (1975).
312. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 452 (1856).

For more on the case, see

WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 53-65 (Vintage 2002) (1987); see also
COVER, supra note 311,

at 166-74 (discussing other important antebellum decisions

regarding slavery).
313. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 411-12 (discussing U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 9, cl.1, Art. IV,

§ 2, cl.
3).
314.

Id. at 411.
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Further evidence that the Constitution did not incorporate the
Declaration is that, following the Civil War, few abolitionists argued that
the Constitution, properly interpreted in light of the Declaration,
abolished slavery without amendment. In fact, even those who held this
belief, or something close to it, recognized that their views were
idiosyncratic. For example, Senator Charles Sumner 3 5 believed that the
Declaration was the "guiding rule for interpretation of the
Constitution., 316 However, even Sumner recognized that his view was
the extreme minority position, and, therefore, worked for passage of
statutes and constitutional amendments to secure his aims.317
Consequently, Radical Republicans passed federal statutes and
constitutional amendments to eliminate slavery. Given the complete
victory of the North and the Republicans, one could easily imagine the
abolitionists arguing that a properly interpreted-unamendedConstitution outlawed slavery, if that argument were remotely plausible.
The more common view of the relationship between the Declaration
and the Constitution at the time of Reconstruction was that the
Declaration established the United States and gave the United States its
goals, and that the Constitution was one of the means of effecting those
goals, though in a flawed manner. Congressman Thaddeus Stevens
explained this view:
Sir, our fathers made the Declaration of Independence; and that is
what they intended to be the foundation of our Government. If they
had been able to base their Constitution on the principles of that
Declaration it would have needed no amendment during all time, for
every human being would have had his rights; every human being
would have been equal before the law... . But it so happened when
our fathers came to reduce the principles on which they founded this
Government into order, in shaping the organic law, an institution hot
from hell appeared among them....
It obstructed all their
movements and all their actions, and precluded them from
carrying
318
out their own principles into the organic law of this Union.

315.

Joseph James has described Sumner as "represent[ing] a very radical position."

JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

70

(Mercer

University Press 1984).
316. Ronald B. Jager, Charles Sumner, the Constitution, and the Civil Rights Act of
1875, 42 NEw ENG. Q. 350, 365-66 (1969); see also DAVID HERBERT DONALD, CHARLES
SUMNER 150-51 (Da Capo Press 1996) (arguing that the federal government had the
constitutional authority and moral duty to eliminate slavery through statute or case law);
CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 2600-2602 (1860) (speech entitled The Barbarism of
Slavery by Senator Sumner).
317. See DONALD, supra note 316, at 132-61 (describing Sumner's efforts).
318. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 536 (1866).
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3. The Declaration
Constitutional Interpretation

Cannot

Offer

Sufficient

Guidance

in

The Declaration is, at most, one source of original meaning in part
because the Declaration cannot, by itself, offer sufficient guidance to
judges (and others) interpreting the Constitution. As Carlton Larson has
noted, "The Declaration's sonorous phrases seem to provide 3little
19
guidance in determining the scope of the liberty of which it speaks.,
The Declaration consists of three main parts. The first part is the
introduction. It states the purpose of government (to secure rights),
recounts how government is legitimated (by consent), lists the natural
rights secured by legitimate government (life, liberty, and pursuit of
revolution is justified
happiness), and gives the conditions under which
320
(when government does not fulfill its purpose).
The introduction sets forth the background against which the second
part of the Declaration, the evidence of tyranny by the King, is judged.
The body of the Declaration provides evidence for the Declaration's
"indictment"321 of the King.322 The list of "evils" visited by King George
on the colonists consists of violations of the English constitution and not
violations of natural law. 323 The final two paragraphs of the Declaration
324
announce the separation of the colonies from the mother country.
Portions of the Declaration's second part-the list of regal
violations of the English constitution-do have sufficient determinacy
and, hence, they may offer valuable insight into constitutional meaning.
I discuss the impact of these phrases below in Part III.D. Declarationists,
however, focus on the rights phrase, which is too indeterminate to
provide guidance to constitutional interpreters.3 25
As I showed above, the rights phrase has been used by scholars of
different political stripes to argue for their favored respective-and
diametrically opposed-substantive policy goals.

326

Even advocates of a

strong role for the Declaration recognize that most scholars view appeals
319. Larson, supra note 112, at 709; see also George W. Carey, Natural Rights,
Equality, and the Declarationof Independence, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 45, 60-66 (2005)

(discussing the meaning of "unalienable rights" and "all men are created equal").
320. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
321. See Anastaplo, supra note 143, at 391-92 (describing the different parts of the
Declaration including the central part of the Declaration which is its "cause of action"
against the King).
322. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 3-30 (U.S. 1776).
323. See supra notes 225-233.
324. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 31-32 (U.S. 1776).
325. See, e.g., GERBER, supra note 1, at 2; Larson, supra note 112, at 711 ("These

scholars [who "emphasize the Declaration"] focus almost exclusively on the second
sentence of the Declaration.").
326. See supra Part II.C.2.
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to the Declaration with suspicion, seeing them as "little more than3 2a7
Rorschach test, into which anything and everything might be read.
Scholars arrive at these different conclusions in part because they begin
from differing philosophical premises. For instance, regarding the term
"Happiness," Declarationist George Anastaplo has argued that it,
"properly understood, must be seen in terms of virtue." 328 Anastaplo
goes on to explain happiness by discussing Aristotle's Nicomachean
Ethics.329 Gerber, by contrast, claims that the "right to 'pursue'
happiness entails claims one individual has on all others ...to strive to

attain his happiness. '330
Gerber grounds his understanding of
"Happiness" on the purported "Lockean natural-rights political
philosophy" of the Declaration.33 1
This deep, continuing disagreement on the meaning of the terms in
the Declaration's rights phrase shows that judges could derive little, if
any, interpretative guidance from them. This is because judges would
first have to determine which of the competing interpretations of the
right the judge finds persuasive-no small feat in itself-and then,
within that interpretation, determine how the abstract term applies in the
concrete case before him. Both of these determinations are complex and
fraught with difficulty because they deal with the meaning of abstract,
contested concepts.332 In addition, judicial use of contested concepts like
"Happiness" would be extremely controversial in the broader society
simply because of the fact that the meanings of the concepts are
themselves controversial.333
In fact, judges have used the terms of the Declaration to reach
controversial substantive goals. During the late-nineteenth and earlytwentieth

centuries,

a period dubbed

the Lochner era,334 judges

327. Larson, supra note 112, at 710; see also GERBER, supra note 1, at 162 (stating
that he will try to show that the Declaration "is sufficiently determinate to be a practical
guide" in individual cases).
328. Anastaplo, supra note 143, at 409.
329. Id. at 409-10.
330. GERBER, supra note 1, at 54.
331. Id. at 28. The right to pursue happiness in the Declaration, for Gerber, led to a
constitutional right to basic material needs. Id. at 194.
332. For a discussion of contested concepts, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE,
supra note

113, at 70-71; RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 145-50 (Harvard

University Press 2006) [hereinafter DWORKIN, JUSTICE INROBES].
333. For example, dramatic controversy arose and has continued since at least Roe v.
Wade's purported interpretation of the concept "liberty," 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and has
continued through Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), with its interpretation of the
same concept.
334. The label Lochner comes from the (in)famous case of Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905), in which the Supreme Court struck down a state statute that limited the
hourly workweek of laborers in bakeries because it violated the constitutional right to
contract. Lochner has come to exemplify the era of economic substantive due process.
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frequently struck down state economic regulation on the basis of an
interpretation of the term "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment.33 5
Judges during this period interpreted "liberty" to include the liberty of
contract which states could abridge only for strong reasons. Judges
founded this interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment on, in part, the
Declaration's reference to the "pursuit of Happiness." For example, in
Butcher's Union Slaughter-house & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent
City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-house Co., 336 Justices Bradley and
Field both concurred and relied on the Declaration's right to pursue
happiness.33 7 And in other cases the Court used the Declaration's rights
phrase in its arguments why challenged state legislation was
unconstitutional.33 8
Of course, the brute fact of disagreement does not, in and of itself,
establish that there is no correct understanding of a legal text, nor does it
establish that all interpretations are equally unreasonable. 33 9 In the
context of contested concepts like "Life," "Liberty," and "pursuit of
Happiness," however, debate and not consensus on the meaning of those
concepts is the norm, at least in pluralistic societies such as our own.
Ronald Dworkin has similarly noted that abstract concepts such as
liberty, equality, and justice are subject to "political battles that rage
about those ideals., 340 As a result, we should have no expectation that
the meaning of the terms in the rights phrase will achieve any sort of
workable consensus in our pluralistic society.
Federal judges are no different. They have strongly divergent views
on most, if not all, substantive moral and philosophical issues. Take, for
instance, "Equality" and the debate over affirmative action. Justices
341
Thomas and Stevens argued in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
that the equality demanded by the Equal Protection Clause mandated
342
opposing conclusions regarding the legality of affirmative action.
335. For an historical review of the economic substantive due process period, see
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW: 1836-1937, at 171-204 (1991).
336. 111 U.S. 746, 762 (1884).
337. See id at 762 (Bradley, J., concurring); see also id. at 756-57 (Field, J.,
concurring); see also Cosgrove, supra note 12, at 114-15 (making the same claim).
338. See Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 160-62 (1879)
(relying on the Declaration's phrase "all men are created equal" to rule that a state statute
that required only railroad corporations to pay attorneys' fees in tort actions violated the
Equal Protection Clause); Cotting v. Godard, 183 U.S. 79, 107 (1901) (relying on the
same language to strike down a state regulation of stockyards).
339. See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 113, at 76-77 (arguing that in the
justification stage of interpretation one must choose that interpretation which is morally
best).
340.

DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES, supra note 332, at 143.

341. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
342. Compare id at 240-41 (1995) (Thomas, J.,concurring), with id. at 243-49
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Justice Thomas contended that the equality demanded by the
Constitution prohibited both laws "designed to subjugate a race and those
that distribute benefits on the basis of race. 343 Thomas found that racial
classifications designed to aid racial minorities embody a "racial
paternalism" that conflicts with the Constitution's "principle of inherent
equality" derived from the Declaration. 3 " Justice Stevens, by contrast,
rejected any equivalence between laws that classify based on race and
benefit a racial minority, and such laws that burden racial minorities:
"Remedial race-based preferences reflect the

. . .

impulse

. . .

to foster

equality in society., 345 Justices Thomas and Stevens were both
interpreting and applying the concept of "equality" as embodied in the
Yet, they came to dramatically divergent
Fifth Amendment.34 6
conclusions because the concept of equality is contested.
Further, consider the right to "Life" proclaimed by the Declaration,
As noted above, the Declarationists
in the context of abortion.
themselves strongly disagree on this issue.347 Hadley Arkes, for
example, argues that the Declaration proclaims a right to life for all
human beings. 348 Therefore, abortion is not only not a natural right, it is
contrary to natural right. 349 By contrast, fellow Declarationist Timothy
Sandefur claims that the Declaration's right to life does not encompass
what he calls "single-celled organisms that do not have minds. 35 °
Gerber takes up yet another position on the meaning of "Life" in the
Declaration finding that since "scientists still disagree on when life
begins," the "natural-rights political philosophy of the Declaration of
Independence cannot determine whether a woman has a constitutional
right to choose whether to have an abortion .... ,35l Declarationists
themselves, like judges and the rest of society, come to wildly divergent
conclusions on the meaning of the abstract concepts in the Declaration's
rights phrase, even on the most important of issues.
The inability of the terms in the Declaration's rights phrase to
provide determinate answers to questions of their application to specific
circumstances (e.g., in cases) should give one pause before concluding
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
343. Id. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring).
344. Id.
345. Id. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
346. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (ruling that the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause has an equal protection component).
347. See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing different views on the impact of the
Declaration).
348.

See generally HADLEY ARKES, NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE 5,

73-111 (2002).
349.

See id.

350.
351.

Sandefur, supra note 3, at 523.
GERBER, supra note 1, at 182-83 (emphasis deleted).
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that the Framers and Ratifiers intended the Declaration to play a unique
role in constitutional interpretation, absent strong evidence. Similarly,
these problems make it difficult to argue that the concepts "Life,"
"Liberty," and "pursuit of Happiness," could practically play a role in
constitutional interpretation.
This is especially true given the great care the Framers and Ratifiers
took in drafting and later in parsing the meaning of the Constitution's
text.352 As Professor Robert Clinton has argued:
It is difficult to read the debates of the Constitutional
Convention without coming to the conclusion that the framers
had a finite sense of the meaning of language and that they
strove to use language precisely to control the governance of
not only the contemporary generation, but also generations to
come. Writing in an age before linguistic contextualism, the
framers at Philadelphia apparently had a fixed vision of the
meanings of the terms they chose. They picked words quite
carefully to convey precisely what they meant, no more and no
less. Debates over the connotations of constitutional terms
reflected a desire to avoid both imprecision and linguistic
redundancy. In some cases the framers deliberately chose
constitutional terminology to create closed-textured phrasing to
prevent future linguistic evasions of their intended meaning.
Given their strong desire to lessen indeterminacy as much as was
practicable, it would be odd if the Framers and Ratifiers understood the
Constitution to incorporate the abstract, contested terms of the rights
phrase.354
As I explain below, the Declaration does and should play a role in
constitutional interpretation as one source of the Constitution's original
meaning. The Declaration is part of the Constitution's historical context
and some of the Constitution's provisions, especially those in the Bill of
Rights, represent the fulfillment of many of the colonists' goals for a just
government. However, the abstract terms in the rights phrase cannot

352.

See RAKOVE, supra note 252, at 342 (arguing that the Framers took great care in

crafting a constitutional text that would be as determinate as possible).
353. Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the
Interpretationof This Constitution,72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1190 (1987).
354. It might be the vagueness of the terms in the rights phrase that is a major part of
the Declaration's attraction. I showed earlier how different groups have used the
Declaration to support their various social reform causes. As Gary Wills has argued:
When the Constitution or some part of the actual government had to be
criticized, this reality could be contrasted with the ideal. One could oppose the
American government without becoming un-American. After all, what is more
American than the Declaration of Independence?
WILLS, supra note 11, at 358.
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play such a role.
C. The DeclarationDoes Not Play a PrivilegedRole in Constitutional
InterpretationBecause of its Own Legal Authority
The Declaration is not Legal in Character Because it does not
1.
Order Members of Society Toward Effective Pursuit of the Common
Good
The Declaration, and especially its rights phrase, does not, of its
own accord, have binding legal authority over judges (or the rest of
society). Instead, the Declaration's legal authority ended by the time the
Articles of Confederation was ratified. Further, the rights phrase, which
is the focus of Declarationist efforts, does not have the character of law.
The Declaration therefore does not play a privileged role in constitutional
interpretation because of its own legal authority.
Laws have, among other characteristics, 355 the characteristic of
ordering the society of which they are a part toward the common good.35 6
This means that laws guide the conduct of members of society to resolve
what John Finnis has labeled the "community's co-ordination
problems. 357 Legislators promulgate laws to enable society's members
to achieve their own goods, their own end of human flourishing,3 58 and to
create the background principles against which that flourishing is
possible; in other words, the goal of law is to secure the conditions
necessary for effective pursuit of the common good.359
A good example of law ordering society is civil rights legislation.
Congress enacted the 1964 Civil Rights Act 360 to alter the conditions of
355. See AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 257, at I-II, q. 90, a. 4. (stating
that law is "[1] an ordinance of reason [2] for the common good, [3] made by him who
has care of the community, and [4] promulgated").
356. See id. at 1-11, q. 90, a. 1 ("Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is
induced to act or is restrained from acting.").
357. FINNIS,supra note 275, at 276.
358. See ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW 44-54, 102-07 (1999), for
a discussion of integral human fulfillment through the rightly ordered pursuit of the basic
human goods.
359. See FINNIS, supra note 275, at 154-56 (describing the common good as "[a] set
of conditions which enables the members of a community to attain for themselves
reasonable objectives, or to realize reasonably for themselves the value(s), for the sake of
which they have reason to collaborate with each other ... in a community").
360. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). For
more background on the 1964 Civil Rights Act, see generally THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF
1964: THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW THAT ENDED RACIAL SEGREGATION (Robert D. Loevy
ed., 1997).

See also NICK KOTZ, JUDGMENT DAYS: LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON, MARTIN

LUTHER KING JR., AND THE LAWS THAT CHANGED AMERICA (2005) (discussing the impact
of The Civil Rights Act of 1964).
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society that had prevented minorities from reaching their full potential.36'
The Act spread its antidiscrimination norm across broad swaths of social
life including voting, public accommodations, public education, federal
programs, and employment. 362 The Act reordered the relationships of
Americans by proscribing relations of racial 363 domination and
prescribing in their place relations based on legally permissible
criteria.364 So, for example, the owners of restaurants could no longer
exclude potential patrons on the basis of race, but the owners could
continue to exclude those who failed to dress appropriately or who
refused to pay.
The Declaration does not, today, order members of our society
toward effective pursuit of the common good. 365 At most, 366 the
Declaration was legally binding when it effected separation of the
colonies from the mother country.367 Prior to July 4, 1776,368 the
361. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 524-25 (3d ed.
2005) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN] (describing the legal oppression of blacks in the South).
362.

See The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).

363.

See id. (among other criteria).
364. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 361, at 529 ("These laws were more sweeping than
any passed since the false dawn of radical reconstruction. And they made a difference.").
365.

See Strang Philosophical Traditions, supra note 167, for a review of the history

of the United States, including its independence, its first constitution, and the framing and
ratification of our current Constitution.
366. In fact, it is arguable whether the Declaration even ordered society on July 4,
1776. The Declaration was not the American colonists' first declaration of independence.
On July 2, 1776, the Second Continental Congress declared independence from Great
Britain. 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789 (Worthington C. Ford
et al. eds., Washington, D.C. 1904-31). Assuming that the Second Continental Congress
had the authority to legislate for the colonies (a fact which is not clear) then it is the July
2 adoption of the Resolution for Independence that reordered the colonies from union
with Great Britain to independence. Consequently, it, and not the Declaration of
Independence, was-if any document was-the ordering legal declaration of
independence.
367. And it may not have done that because the Declaration's legality depended on
the authority of the Second Continental Congress to legislate.
368. I have not come to a conclusion whether, in fact (if not de jure), the American
colonies became a separate, united society upon independence. One's conclusion will
depend on the criteria one uses to determine when a society exists. One could argue, for
example, that there existed prior to July 4, 1776, a society because in fact the officiallyBritish colonies were pursuing their own, distinct, common good separately from Great
Britain. On this reading of history, the Declaration simply declared de jure what was
already de facto the case. See Larson, supra note 112, at 737 (arguing that the
Declaration effected the creation of one nation). On the other hand, one could argue that
the Declaration, of its own accord, did not create a separate society but instead created
thirteen separate societies that did not become one society, coherently pursuing the
common good, until some time later. See FOREST MCDONALD, NovuS ORDO SECLORUM:
THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 150 (1985) (offering this view); see
also AMAR, supra note 223, at 21-26 (same). There are other possible interpretations of
the historical record as well. Regardless of the effect of the Declaration beyond
independence from Great Britain, most agree that by the time of the Ratification of the
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American colonies were part of the British Empire, and recognized
themselves as such. The colonies were subject to laws passed by
Parliament, rule by the King, and to decisions of the British courts. The
colonies participated in the common enterprise of the Empire.
The Declaration changed the relationship of the colonies to the rest
of the Empire by making the colonies a separate society, separately
pursuing the common good of its members.
In this changereordering-from unity to separation, the Declaration constituted law.
This reading is borne out by the last paragraph of the Declaration which
declares the colonies' independence.36 9 Its language is legal in form,
unlike the rights phrase. It "declare[s]" that the colonies "are ...

Free

and Independent States" and that the colonies' ties to Great Britain are
"dissolved., 370 This reading of the Declaration's impact is bolstered by
the fact that we trace our independence to the Declaration and not to the
Treaty of Paris.
The Declaration separated the individuals and
nongovernmental institutions of the colonies from Great Britain and,
importantly, precipitated the creation of permanent governmental
apparatuses to oversee the newly-independent states' pursuit of the
common good.37 '

Once the separation between the colonies and the Empire was
complete, and the newly-independent states were separately pursuing the
common good, the Declaration's legal effect was spent. It no longer, of
its own accord, ordered the members of American society toward
effective pursuit of the common good. The Declaration did not, for
instance, change how people acted in 1782. It did not coordinate the
activities of Americans because the separation was a past event that later
legal norms and social practices superseded.
By 1782, the Articles of Confederation were in force creating a
national government that enabled American society to (rather
ineffectively) pursue the common good and to do so separately from
Great Britain.372 The Declaration no longer created or maintained the
independence of the United States from Great Britain, as it does not
today. If, for example, tomorrow Congress passed and the President
signed 373 a law that stated, "The Declaration of Independence is not in
Constitution, one American society existed.
369.
370.
371.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776).
Id.
See JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 12-19 (1951) (describing the role

of the state as that part of a society which oversees and coordinates the activities of
subsidiary institutions toward effective pursuit of the common good); see also FINNIS,
supra note 275, at 147-50 (describing the complete community).
372. See THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. III (1781) (stating that the purpose of

the Confederacy was to secure "their mutual and general welfare").
373. See id. at art. V (One could revise the hypothetical so that the "repeal" of the
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force," the effect would not be immediate reunion with Great Britain.
Instead, the law would have no effect because the Constitution would
continue in operation and would continue to mandate that the federal
government pursue the common good of the United States separately
from that of the United Kingdom.374
As an analogy, consider a hypothetical law (the Highway Law)
passed by a state that required the executive of the state to bring eminent
domain proceedings against the private owner of a particular parcel of
land (Blackacre) and acquire title to the parcel for the state. The land
was to be part of a new highway across the state. The executive brought
the action and the court directed the owner to convey title to the state in
exchange for just compensation. The exchange then occurred. At this
point, the Highway Law has ceased to govern, of its own accord, the
relations of members of society because it has had its full effect and now
the state owns Blackacre. The Highway Law reordered social relations
but does not maintain the relations in their reordered state.
If the state later enacted a law declaring the Highway Law void, it
would not change the relationships between the state, Blackacre, and the
previous owner because the state's law of property now governed those
relations. The state owned Blackacre. The executive could not, absent
some additional authorizing provision, return Blackacre to the previous
owner; and the previous owner could not simply retake possession (much
less ownership) of Blackacre because the state's property law protected
the state's ownership of Blackacre by, for example, authorizing the state
to bring suit to stop the previous owner from repossessing Blackacre.
The Highway Law hypothetical shows that the legal effect of some
legislation is short-lived. Some laws alter the relationships of individuals
and entities in society and then cease to have effect because other legal
norms (or quasi-legal or nonlegal social practices) apply to the
relationships-as altered by the original law-to maintain the social
ordering brought about by the original law. To make this even more
clear in the Highway Law hypothetical, assume that the state
subsequently enacted legislation (the Highway Construction Act) that
directed the construction of the highway across Blackacre and created
regulations for the operation of the highway (e.g., maintenance
regulations, a speed limit, weight and size limits, safety and
environmental regulations, etc.).
Persons using the highway across Blackacre after passage of the

Declaration came about through an Article V federal convention).
374. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (specifying the scope of Congress' legislative power
to pursue the "general Welfare"); id. at art. VI (identifying the Constitution as the
"supreme Law of the Land").
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Highway Construction Act are governed, not by the Highway Law, but
instead by the Highway Construction Act. This situation is similar to the
relationships of Americans to the Declaration and the Constitution today.
The Declaration, like the Highway Law, reordered relations. The
Declaration did this through separating the colonies from Great Britain
and the Highway Law did this through transferring ownership of
Blackacre to the state. But, with the passage of subsequent legislation,
both the Declaration and the Highway Law lost their status as the law
that was ordering members of society toward the common good. Today,
the Constitution shapes the conduct of our society's governments,
subsidiary communities, and individual members.
Similarly, the
Highway Construction Act shaped the actions of persons maintaining
and using the highway across Blackacre.
To take another example, assume that two persons who are married
seek a divorce. A judge issues a divorce decree. The judge's decree is
the legal norm that reordered the relationship of the formerly-married
couple, and it continues to order their relationship until a further legal
norm enters into the picture. So long as the divorce decree remains in
effect, the former spouses may remarry: either each other, or other
persons. Upon remarriage, the state's law governing marriage and not
the divorce decree would govern (some of) the relations between the
former spouses. If the divorce decree ceased to be effective (perhaps
through reversal), then the couple's relationship would assume its former
shape. For example, if the decree ceased to exist and then one of the
former spouses remarried (a third person), that former spouse would
have committed bigamy.
The original marriage of the hypothetical spouses is analogous to
the relationship of the colonies to the Crown. The marriage laws ordered
the relations of the spouses like the laws of Great Britain ordered the
relations of the colonies to other parts of the Empire. The divorce decree
reordered relations as did the Declaration, by legally separating what was
formerly united. The Declaration and the divorce decree continued to
govern the relations of the parties until a subsequent legal norm was
established. In the case of the United States, the subsequent state
constitutions and eventually the Articles of Confederation substituted for
the Declaration to maintain the separation from Great Britain, while in
the case of the divorcees, subsequent marriage did so. This is the
situation today with the Declaration: today, the Constitution, and not the
Declaration, orders our society. Part of the social ordering assumed by
the Constitution from the Declaration is pursuit of the common good
separate from Great Britain.
Reenactment of the Northwest Ordinance by the First Congress,
discussed immediately below, is a real-life analogue to the Declaration's
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ceasing to be authoritative and thereby ceasing to order members of
society. This is because both were passed by the Second Continental
Congress. The actions of the First Congress establish that, under the
Constitution's Supremacy Clause, prior national legislation 375 such as the
Declaration and the Northwest Ordinance ceased to be authoritative,
absent reenactment under the Constitution, which the Declaration never
was.
In sum, the Declaration does not have a unique role in constitutional
interpretation because of its own legally authoritative status. As I have
shown, any legal authority the Declaration possessed was spent by the
time or because of the Articles of Confederation was ratified.
The Declaration's rights phrase is also not a binding legal norm
because it does not order members of our society toward the common
good.376 Unlike the last section of the Declaration, which had legal
effect, albeit short-lived, the rights phrase never had legal effect because
its language does not change-reorder-the relationships of members of
society.
The language of the rights phrase is not imperative; it does not
purport to order members of society to do or refrain from doing
something. A central case of a law is a speed limit: "Users of the
highway shall drive a maximum of 55 m.p.h. 3 77 This imperative
language orders members of our society to drive at a particular speed so
that highway users can safely and efficiently utilize the highways. The
language of the rights phrase, by contrast, does not purport to order
individuals to do or refrain from doing anything.
Many of us, when driving on the highway at a speed in excess of the
speed limit, will alter our speed to comply with the speed limit. If we
fail to abide by the speed limit and are fined for this failure, we recognize
that our actions were, absent unusual circumstances, illegal, and that the
fine was therefore legitimate.
This does not occur with the rights phrase. Members of our society
do not intend to act in one manner only to recall the rights phrase and
then change their course of conduct. If we feel an obligation to act in
accord with the rights phrase, it is different from the obligation we feel to
act in accord with legitimate laws such as a highway speed limit.
This is because the rights phrase is hortatory. It exhorts us as
individuals and as a society to treat others with, for example, respect.
However, if we treat another in a manner contrary to the rights phrase we

375.
376.
377.
275, at

Not including treaties.
See O'Neill, supra note 170, at 77-78 (making a similar argument).
For a discussion of the "central case" or "focal meaning" see Finnis, supra note
9-11.
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would not characterize our actions as illegal; instead, we would
characterize them as immoral. Consequently, while the rights phrase
may offer sound moral guidance, it is not a legal command and hence
does not play a role in constitutional interpretation because of its own
legal authority.
2.
Actions of Congress Show that the Declaration is Not a
Binding Legal Norm
a.

Re-enactment of the Northwest Ordinance

One particularly strong piece of evidence showing that the
Declaration has no independent legal significance is the First Congress'
re-enactment of the Northwest Ordinance. 378 This event shows that the
Declaration ceased to have legally operative effect (supposing that it
continued to do so after ratification of the Articles) because of the
Supremacy Clause's adoption.379
The Second Continental Congress enacted the Northwest Ordinance
in 1787, prior to completion of the Federal Convention. 380
The
Northwest Ordinance was the great legislative triumph of the Continental
Congress in that it created the structure of western settlement and
eventual statehood of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and
Wisconsin.3 8 1
After the Constitution went into effect, the First Congress, in the
eighth act it passed, re-enacted the Northwest Ordinance. 38 2 Congress
recognized that it had to re-enact the Northwest Ordinance because,
absent re-enactment, the Ordinance had no authority under the
Constitution. This was because the Supremacy Clause provided that
only the Constitution, laws made pursuant to the Constitution, and
treaties were the law of the United States.383 The First Congress stated in
378. For a review of the history of the Northwest Ordinance, see Denis P. Duffey,
Note, The Northwest Ordinanceas a ConstitutionalDocument, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 929,

934-41 (1995).

For a discussion of the Confederation Congress' ordinances more

generally, see Richard P. McCormick, Ambiguous Authority: The Ordinances of the
Confederation Congress, 1781-1789,41 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 411 (1997).

379. See O'Neill, supra note 170, at 99-100 (making a similar argument).
380. The Northwest Ordinance was enacted on July 13, 1787. See McCormick, supra
note 380 at 433. The Philadelphia Convention ended on September 17, 1787, and the
Constitution did not take effect until June 21, 1788, when nine states had ratified it. The
last state, Rhode Island, ratified the Constitution on May 29, 1790.
381. See Duffey, supra note 378, at 968 n.6. The Northwest Territory also contained
a portion of what became Minnesota. Id.
382. See An Act to provide for the Government of the Territory North-west of the
river Ohio, I Stat. 50 (1789).
383. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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the Act that "in order that the [Northwest] Ordinance ...may continue to
have full effect, it is requisite that certain provisions should be made, so
as to adapt the same to the present Constitution of the United States. 384
In other words, with the ratification of the Constitution, all previous
legislation by the Second Continental Congress (other than treaties)
became inoperable.
The Declaration, like the Northwest Ordinance, was enacted by the
Second Continental Congress. It too, absent re-enactment, ceased to
have legal force (assuming it retained independent, ongoing legal force
after independence, which, I argued above, it did not). Of course, the
Declaration was never re-enacted and hence, after ratification of the
Constitution, did not have legal force.
The re-enactment of the Northwest Ordinance and the
corresponding failure to re-enact the Declaration supports my earlier
claim that the Declaration's legal force was spent by the time of, or
because of, ratification of the Articles of Confederation. The Northwest
Ordinance was needed because it played a vital role in western
settlement. By contrast, the Declaration was no longer necessary to
maintain independence. That role was assumed by the Constitution
under which the First Congress operated.
The re-enactment of the Northwest Ordinance also shows how the
First Congress and President Washington understood the relationship
between the Constitution and previous legislation. It shows that the
original understanding of the Constitution (and specifically the
Supremacy Clause) was that the Constitution superseded all preconstitutional legislation (with the exception of treaties) including the
Declaration.
This understanding supports my argument that the
Declaration is a source of the Constitution's original meaning, but that it
does not have binding legal significance beyond that.
b.
The Declaration's Placement in the United States Code Shows
that the Declaration is Not a Binding Legal Norm
Declarationists regularly argue that the Declaration's placement at
the beginning of the United States Code under the heading "Organic
Laws of the United States," establishes that the Declaration is, in the
words of Walter Berns, a "law of the United States. 385 The first title of

384.

1 Stat. 50 (1789) (emphasis added).

385.

WALTER BERNS, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY 23 (1987).

See also

KMIEC, supra note 139, at 101 ("[T]he United States Code includes the Declaration of
Independence as one of the Organic Laws upon which all statutory law rests."); Trapp,
supra note 108, at 834 (arguing that the Declaration's placement at the beginning of the
U.S. Code signifies that it "has authority").
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the U.S. Code begins with a section entitled: "The Organic Laws of the
United States of America." 386 The Code then reprints the Declaration,
the Articles of Confederation, the Northwest Ordinance, and the
Constitution. 387 Contrary to claims by Declarationist scholars like Berns,
the process that brought about placement of the Declaration at the
beginning of the U.S. Code provides further evidence that the
Declaration does not have a unique role in constitutional interpretation.
The first subject matter codification of federal statutes was the
Revised Statutes, enacted in 1878.388 The Revised Statutes collected and
organized federal statutes that had previously been collected
chronologically in the Statutes at Large.389 However, after 1878
Congress failed to incorporate later enactments into the Revised Statutes,
leading to calls for another codification effort. 390 These calls bore fruit
with the 1926 U.S. Code, which contained the "general and permanent
laws of the United States in force December 7, 1925. "391
The present U.S. Code is a compilation of fifty titles, each focused
on a particular subject matter. Title I includes general provisions and
contains, as its first document, the Declaration.3 92 While its placement at
the beginning of the Code could signal that the Declaration has
independent legal validity, a look at the background context of the 1926
recodification shows that the opposite is the case.
On June 30, 1926, Congress enacted the law that created the 1926
U.S. Code.3 93 The Act ordered that the "general and permanent laws of
the United States" be codified.394 In Section 1 of a companion statute,
Congress provided for the printing of the Code and other materials. 395 In

386.
387.

U.S.C., at 1 (2000).
See id. at 1-54.

388. See An act providing for publication of the revised statutes and the laws of the
United States, 18 Stat. 113 (1874) (requiring the codification of the "statutes of a general
and permanent nature"); An act to provide for the preparation and publication of a new
edition of the Revised Statutes of the United States, 19 Stat. 268 (1877).
389. See 18 Stat. 113 (1874); 19 Stat. 268 (1877).
390. For an earlier effort at recodification, see Joint Resolution Authorizing the
printing of the bill to consolidate, codify, revise, and reenact the general and permanent
laws of the United States, 41 Stat. 370 (1919).
391. An Act To consolidate, codify, and set forth the general and permanent laws of
the United States in force December seventh, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-five,
44 Stat. 1 (1926).
392. See U.S.C., at 1-5 (2000).
393. See 44 Stat. 1 (1926).
394. Id. The Act providing for the creation of the Revised Statutes used essentially
the same language to describe the category of laws to be included. See 18 Stat. 113
(1874).
395. See An Act To provide for the publication of the Act to consolidate, codify, and
set forth the general and permanent laws of the United States in force December 7, 1925,
with index, reference tables, appendix, and so forth, 44 Stat. 778 (1926).
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Section 2 of the companion statute, Congress authorized the House
Committee on the Revision of the Laws to prepare for publication "as
ancillariesthereto"-that is, ancillary to the general and permanent laws
of the United States-a list of materials. 396 Here is the list:
(1) Preface. (2) Table of Contents. (3) Parallel Reference Tables to
the Revised Statutes .... (4) Parallel Reference Tables to the Statutes
(5) Parallel Reference Tables to the United States
at Large ....
(6) Parallel Reference Tables to the Federal
Compiled Statutes ....
Statutes. (7) The Declaration of Independence. (8) The Articles of
Confederation. (9) The Ordinance of 1787. (10) The Constitution of
(11) Appendix....
the United397 States and amendments.
(12) Index.
The Sixty-Ninth Congress recognized that the Declaration was not
of independent legal significance in a number of ways. First and most
importantly, Congress did not include the Declaration among the
"general and permanent laws of the United States. 39 8 Congress
the nonlegal status of the Declaration by labeling it
explicitly recognized
"ancillar[y].,, 399 This shows that the Declaration, although important
historically, culturally, and in other ways, was not legally binding
subsequent to the Constitution.
Second, the list of "ancillar[y]" materials includes documents that
are clearly nonlegal in nature: the Preface, Table of Contents, and the
reference tables were never and never could be legal. 40 0 Therefore, the
mere fact of placement in the U.S. Code does not, contrary to what some
Declarationist scholars have argued, lead to the conclusion that the
document is legally authoritative.
Third, the list of "ancillar[y]" materials includes documents that are
clearly no longer legally binding. 401 The list contains the Articles of
Confederation and the Northwest Ordinance which were both superseded
by the Constitution. Consequently, placement of the Declaration in the
U.S. Code does not show that the Declaration retained its legally binding
force.
Fourth, the list of "ancillar[y]" materials includes the Constitution
which is clearly legally binding regardless of placement in the U.S.
Code.4 °2 So again, placement in the Code does not necessarily signify
that the Declaration is legally binding.
396.
397.
398.
399.

44 Stat. 778 (1926) (emphasis added).
Id.
See 44 Stat. 1 (1926).
See 44 Stat. 778 (1926).

400.

Id.

401.
402.

Id.
See 44 Stat. 778 (1926).
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Lastly, the purpose of printing the Declaration, Articles, Northwest
Ordinance, and Constitution, in addition to the general and permanent
laws of the United States, was to give pride-of-place to those documents
that had a profound impact in shaping our nation. These are the laws that
"define and establish [our] government," as Black's Law Dictionary
defines organic documents.4 °3 By including America's organic laws in
the beginning of the Code, Congress followed in the path of the FortyFourth Congress which had also required their inclusion in the earlier
Revised Statutes.40 4 Congress' purpose in placing them in the Code was
not to identify any continuing legal validity of the documents, but instead
to recognize the contributions they had made to our nation's government.
As shown above, the Declaration's placement in the Code does not
indicate a judgment by Congress that the Declaration has independent
legal significance. On the contrary, I have shown that Congress' actions
in codifying federal law support my contention that the Declaration's
legal significance comes only through its influence on the original
meaning of the Constitution.
D. ProperRole of the Declarationin ConstitutionalInterpretation
The proper role of the Declaration of Independence in constitutional
interpretation is as one source of the original meaning of the
Constitution's text. As discussed earlier, to arrive at the constitutional
text's original meaning, one must look to the Constitution's text, its
structure, evidence surrounding ratification on how the text was
understood, and the background against which the text405was understood
including legal, philosophical, and social circumstances.
For example, the Sixth Amendment protects the right to trial by jury
in criminal prosecutions.40 6 The right to trial by a jury of one's peers in
criminal prosecutions has deep roots in English and American law.40 7 In
the period of conflict leading up to the Revolution, the right to a criminal
jury trial was one of the rights threatened by the Crown.40 8 The Stamp
Act of 1765 provided that admiralty courts, which did not have juries,
would be the forum of enforcement.40 9 In addition, the Coercive Acts of

403.
404.

BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1126(7th ed. 1999).
See 19 Stat. 268 (1877) ("That there shall also be included in said edition ..... )

(emphasis added).
405. For a short discussion of the use of the Declaration as a source of original
meaning by the courts, see Larson, supra note 112, at 717-19.
406. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
407. See generally LEVY, supra note 266, at 210-30 (reviewing the history of the
double jury system).
408. See id. at 226-27.
409. Id. at 226.
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1774 provided that trial of some violations of the Act be held in
England.41 °
The colonists' response to Crown infringements on the right to a
criminal jury trial was strong. 4 11 The Stamp Act Congress objected to
the Stamp Act's denial of jury trials in criminal cases, and the First
Continental Congress protested the same denial by the Coercive Acts. 412
The Declaration of Independence, approved by the Second Continental
Congress, was part of this American reaction to systemic Crown
incursion on colonists' rights.413 The Declaration declares, as one of the
charges against King George 414
III, that he "depriv[ed] us, in many cases,
of the benefit of trial by jury.,
Following the Revolution, every state constitution protected the
right to a jury trial, and the absence of similar protection in the proposed
federal Constitution nearly prevented its ratification. 415 The famous
Federalist concession of a bill of rights to secure ratification led
eventually to James Madison's introduction of amendments that became
the Bill of Rights, including a provision in the Sixth Amendment
protecting the right to a trial by jury in criminal proceedings. 6
Consequently, the Declaration is one source of the original meaning
of the right to jury trial in the Sixth Amendment. The Declaration sheds
light on why Madison proposed the Sixth Amendment and points to the
common law background of the right.417
E.

The Declaration'sMany Roles

The short discussion on the proper role of the Declaration in
constitutional interpretation in Part III.D is not exhaustive, nor is it
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Id. at 226-27.
Id.
See LEVY, supra note 268, at 227.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776).

415. See LEVY, supra note 266, at 227-28.
416. Id. at 230.
417. Another, somewhat ironic example, of the Declaration's role in constitutional
interpretation is its charge that King George had "affected to render the military
independent of and superior to the civil power." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
para. 14 (U.S. 1776). During the initial stages of the Civil War, Lincoln suspended the
writ of habeas corpus to protect Washington, D.C., from Confederate sympathizers. See
DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 299 (1995). See also WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL
THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 22-23 (1998).

John Merryman was

imprisoned in Fort McHenry by the Army pursuant to executive order, and Merryman
sought release through a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 26. In his opinion, which ruled that
Lincoln did not have the power to suspend the writ, Chief Justice Taney relied on the
Declaration's charge that King George had denied civil authority over the military. See
Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 152 n.3 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
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exhaustive of the other roles the Declaration does and should play. The
Declaration is a source of national pride. It has a justly prominent role in
our nation's annual celebration of its birth.4 18 The Declaration's
language is beautiful. And the Declaration has many legal roles to play,
outside of the context of constitutional interpretation. For example,
many states date the severance of their common law from England's to
the Declaration, 4 19 and American citizenship is dated from the
Declaration. 420 This Article in no way downplays the continuing role of
the Declaration in many areas of life.
IV. Conclusion
In this Article, I argued that the Declaration of Independence is one
of many sources of the original meaning of the text of the Constitution.
First, I laid out the background debate over the role of the Declaration in
constitutional interpretation. Then I described how appeals to the
Declaration have periodically arisen during times of national moral
crisis, such as those over slavery or civil rights. I also detailed how
scholars have relied on the Declaration to support dramatically
inconsistent claims of political morality and constitutional norm.
Assuming an originalist perspective on constitutional interpretation,
I then argued that the historical evidence from the Framing and
Ratification of the "original" Constitution shows that the Declaration is
simply one source of the original meaning of the Constitution. In
addition, I argued that the Declaration is not the "interpretative key" to
the Constitution because of the inconsistencies between the two
documents, and because the Declaration cannot provide sufficient
interpretative guidance. Lastly, I advanced arguments to establish that
the Declaration is not independently legally binding. In doing so, I
rebutted many of the common Declarationist claims.
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See Larson, supra note 112, at 750-53 (discussing the early celebrations of

Independence Day on July 4).

419. See generally Larson, supra note 112, at 713-21 (discussing the continuing legal
roles of the Declaration).
420. See, e.g., Inglis v. Trustees of the Sailor's Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 121
(1830).

